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 This thesis consists of two central Parts.  Part 1 examines the extent to which an 
agent’s transaction-specific investments (TSIs) in a customer relationship increase his/her 
concerns for opportunism by his/her own co-workers.  Thus, unlike prior research in 
marketing that examines opportunism by the recipient of TSIs, I show that agents become 
concerned with opportunism by non-recipients of TSIs.  I then introduce novel 
moderators that shape the relationship between TSIs and concerns for internal 
opportunism.  Importantly, I also show that in response to concerns for internal 
opportunism, agents will engage in internal safeguarding behaviors.  Notably, unlike 
external safeguards between firms which tend to benefit firms (e.g., relational norms), I 
show that internal safeguarding has a deleterious effect on performance.  I test the set of 
hypotheses with data collected from two sources: account managers and their supervisors.  
 
 In Part 2, I advance the emerging view on customer solutions by simultaneously 
examining the networks within and between selling and buying teams involved in the 
development and deployment of complex customer solutions.  Such a concurrent within-
and-between perspective helps to bridge research on buying and selling teams, which 
prior research tends to examine only in isolation of each other.  This research also 
extends the literature by showing how within-team network characteristics interact with 
between-team network characteristics to affect solution effectiveness.  Notably, I advance 
the literature by moving beyond firm-level and individual-level dyads to team-level 
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dyads and introduce a new network characteristic – mirrored ties – to help our 
understanding of the interactions between these dyads.  I develop my hypotheses in the 
context of a sales team selling a complex customer solution to a buying team and test the 






INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
 In this thesis, I “zigzag” across the firm’s boundary to better understand the 
interplay between interfirm activities and intrafirm activities.  Part 1, for example, 
examines how an agent’s investments in a customer relationship affect his/her concern 
for internal opportunism and, subsequently, his/her internal safeguarding behaviors.  Part 
2 builds on this notion by examining how communication patterns both within selling 
teams and between buying and selling teams affect the overall effectiveness of customer 
solutions. 
 Part 1 makes three central contributions.  First, I introduce the notion of mTSIs 
(transaction-specific investments made by agents of the firm) and propose that agents 
who make specific investments in customers become concerned with opportunism by 
their own teammates (i.e., concerned with internal opportunism by non-recipients of 
mTSIs).  This is in stark contrast to the extant view which only considers opportunism by 
the recipient of TSIs.   
 Second, I introduce and test novel moderators of the mTSIs-concern for internal 
opportunism relationship that surface when taking an internal, ‘micro-perspective’.  
These include promotion aspirations of specialists, agent-customer extendedness and 
specialist-customer extendedness. 
 Third, I surface a key consequence of internal opportunism – internal 
safeguarding.  Notably, unlike prior research which generally shows positive 
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consequences of external (or firm-level) safeguards such as relational norms (e.g., Heide 
and John 1992), I show that internal safeguarding has deleterious effects on performance. 
 Part 1 employs the context of individual account managers (agents) that invest 
their time and energies to cultivate their customers (via mTSIs), but also draw on the 
support of specialists – i.e., product and technical specialist teammates on as as-needed 
basis to deepen customer relationships.  Such a context is ideal because the information 
asymmetries inherent in such teams are fertile ground for internal opportunism (Wathne 
and Heide 2000).  I test my hypotheses from data collected from two different sources: 
account managers (for the independent variables) and their supervisors (for the dependent 
variables) 
 
 Part 2 makes the following contributions.  First, I show that intrafirm (e.g., within 
both the selling and buying teams) and interfirm (between the selling and buying teams) 
linkages jointly affect the effectiveness of customer solutions at both the solution 
development and deployment phases.  Such a perspective is noteworthy, because I show 
that the ability of one team to be effective (e.g., selling team) depends in large part on the 
relational characteristics between teams (e.g., between the buying and selling teams). 
Second, the implicit assumption in the literature is that strong relational ties 
between network members, generally speaking, have very positive effects.  However, to 
date, there is little understanding about whether strong ties between teams, for example, 
compliment or substitute for strong ties within teams or whether strong ties are needed at 
both the solution development and the solution deployment phases.  These notions are of 
particular consequence because strong relational ties within and between teams can be 
 3 
 
very costly to develop and maintain (Hansen 1999).  Therefore, from an efficiency and 
practical standpoint, it behooves managers to understand whether, where and when to 
encourage strong ties (e.g., within and/or between teams; at the development and/or the 
deployment phase). 
Third, I extend the emerging view on the importance of the structural aspects of 
interfirm relationships by focusing on the structure of relations between buying and 
selling teams (Wuyts et al. 2004).  Specifically, I introduce the concepts of mirrored ties 
(i.e., ties between a network member and similar others -- in this thesis, I focus on 
knowledge similarity) and more-than-mirrored ties (i.e., ties between a network member 
and similar others (i.e., mirrored ties) and dissimilar others) to lend clarity and context to 
the preferred network structures between buying and selling teams during both the 
solution development and deployment phases.  
Finally, this study sheds new light on buying and selling teams.  Although 
empirical work tends to examine these teams in isolation of each other, I show that the 
ability of one team to be effective (e.g., selling team) depends in large part on the 
relational characteristics between teams (e.g., between the buying and selling teams).  
This contribution is particularly timely, given the increasing use and importance of, yet 
paucity of empirical research on, selling teams in practice (Homburg, Workman, and 
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 Team-based structures are becoming increasingly important in marketing and 
sales organizations.  This is evidenced by the significant increase of key account 
management teams (e.g., Homburg, Workman, and Jensen 2002; Jones et al. 2005), 
product development teams (e.g., Sethi, Smith, and Park 2001) and boundary-spanning 
service teams (e.g., Jong, Ruyter, and Lemmink 2004).  The rationale for setting up team-
based structures is to craft superior customer offerings.  One potential issue, however, is 
that such structures are ripe for team member opportunism which can hurt performance 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Wathne and Heide 2000).  We refer to this type of 
opportunism as internal opportunism because it stems from within the organization.  The 
purpose of this paper is to better understand its role within teams, its antecedents, and 
consequences.    
 The focus on internal opportunism (i.e., opportunism by teammates) is in stark 
contrast to past literature which centers primarily on external opportunism (i.e., 
opportunism between firms) (Wathne and Heide 2000).  Previous literature assumes that 
internal opportunism can be effectively controlled through fiat and other internal 
governance mechanisms (e.g., Williamson 1975).  We argue, however, that the structure 
of most marketing and sales teams makes mechanisms such as fiat play a much less 
significant role in controlling internal opportunism.  Indeed, recent work supports this 
notion and argues that internal opportunism is widespread within firms (Ghoshal and 
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Moran 1996).  Surprisingly, there is little empirical research which speaks to the 
implications of internal opportunism for marketing teams. 
Similar to previous research, we take the position that opportunism is engendered 
by transaction-specific investments (TSIs) (e.g., Anderson 1988; Rokkan, Heide, and 
Wathne 2003).  However, we depart from this perspective in two important ways.  First, 
while prior research speaks to TSIs made by firms, we introduce the notion of micro-TSIs 
or mTSIs which refer to transaction-specific investments that individuals make on behalf 
of their firm.  In a key account team context, an example of mTSIs are the investments an 
account manager makes to understand the unique buying policies and procedures of a 
specific customer.  Second, prior research suggests that firms making TSIs become 
vulnerable to opportunism by firms that are recipients of these investments (e.g., Jap and 
Ganesan 2000; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  We build upon this view and take the 
position that an agent making investments can also become vulnerable to opportunism 
from non-recipients of the investments.  Specifically, we argue that that agents who make 
mTSIs in their customer relationships become vulnerable to (and, therefore, concerned 
with) internal opportunism by their own team members (henceforth referred to as 
specialists). 
 The extent to which an investing agent becomes concerned with internal 
opportunism is not that straightforward (Crosno and Dahlstrom 2007; Rokkan, Heide, 
and Wathne 2003).  We draw on extant literature to identify three moderating variables 
that can significantly shape the relationship between mTSIs and internal opportunism.  
Williamson (1985) suggests that internal promotion incentives can effectively curb 
internal opportunism.  We test this prevailing assumption and examine whether 
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promotion aspirations of specialists can mitigate the relationship between mTSIs and 
concern for internal opportunism.  In addition, while prior research examines 
extendedness at an aggregate level, we show that two types of extendedness emerge when 
disaggregated and examined at a micro-level of analysis – agent-customer extendedness 
and specialist-customer extendedness.  Taking a disaggregated view of extendedness is 
important because agent-customer extendedness is expected to sharpen the relationship 
between mTSIs and concern for internal opportunism, whereas specialist-customer 
extendedness is expected to dampen it.  Thus we show that extendedness, a well-
documented interfirm governance mechanism (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1989; Rokkan, 
Heide, and Wathne 2003), can morph and have different effects on concerns for internal 
opportunism when examined through a micro lens. 
 Lastly, ours is among the first studies to examine a key consequence of concern 
for opportunism – internal safeguarding.  Importantly, we suggest that concern for 
internal opportunism leads to internal safeguarding behaviors which, in turn, adversely 
affect performance with customers.     
 We make three key contributions to the literature: 
 We introduce the notion of mTSIs and propose that agents who make specific 
investments in customers become concerned with opportunism by their own 
teammates (i.e., concerned with internal opportunism by non-recipients of 
mTSIs).  This is in contrast to the extant view which only considers opportunism 
by the recipient of TSIs. 
 We identify and test novel moderators of the mTSIs-concern for internal 
opportunism relationship that surface when taking an internal, ‘micro-
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perspective’.  These include promotion aspirations of specialists, agent-customer 
extendedness and specialist-customer extendedness. 
 We surface a key consequence of internal opportunism – internal safeguarding.  
Notably, unlike prior research which generally shows positive consequences of 
external (or firm-level) safeguards such as relational norms (e.g., Heide and John 
1992), we suggest that internal safeguarding can have deleterious effects on 
performance.  
 The present research employs the context of individual account managers (agents) 
that invest their time and energies to cultivate their customers (via mTSIs), but also draw 
on the support of specialists – i.e., product and technical specialist teammates on as as-
needed basis to deepen customer relationships.  Such a context is ideal because the 
information asymmetries inherent in such teams are fertile ground for internal 
opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000).  We test our hypotheses from data collected from 
two different sources: account managers (for the independent variables) and their 






















3.1 Concern for Internal Opportunism  
The concern for internal opportunism is defined as the extent to which an agent (e.g., 
account manager) is concerned that specialists will act selfishly with guile towards 
him/her.  For instance, account managers may be concerned that their specialists will try 
to take undue credit for business s/he develops with a customer.  Extant marketing 
literature tends to focus on actual opportunism (e.g., John 1984; Rokkan, Heide, and 
Wathne 2003) rather than the concern for opportunism.  Actual opportunism tends to 
include opportunistic (in)actions (e.g., shirking, free riding) that have already taken place 
(Wathne and Heide 2000).  This distinction is important because one is likely to self-
select out of a relationship in response to actual opportunism; however, one is more likely 
to maintain a relationship if concern for opportunism can be effectively mitigated.   
 Agents concern for internal opportunism stems from three main reasons.  First, 
the structure of many marketing and sales teams is such that team members often have 
little legitimate authority over one another.  In a key account team, for instance, the key 
account manager typically has little or no formal authority over specialists.  The lack of 
authority to punish malfeasance means that there is little opportunity for team members 
to align interests by fiat (Williamson 1975).  Second, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue 
that internal control systems can reduce one’s affinity towards a firm, engendering 
opportunistic proclivities by employees.  Correspondingly, some suggest that common 
forms of internal control systems (e.g., behavioral and outcome controls) can engender 
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dysfunctional and opportunistic behaviors (Ramaswami 1996).  Third, by their very 
nature, many teams bring in members with different skill sets and, thus, the information 
asymmetries inherent within these teams makes it difficult for team members to detect 
opportunism, which makes them more vulnerable to opportunism (Wathne and Heide 
2000). 
 
3.2 micro -Transaction-Specific Investments or mTSIs 
Agents of the firm make individual transaction-specific investments on behalf of their 
firm.  We label these investments mTSIs and define them as non-redeployable 
investments of time and effort that an agent makes on behalf of his/her firm.  For 
instance, in a key account management setting, these are the specific investments that an 
account manager makes in a particular customer relationship (cf. Galunic and Anderson 
2000).  The key account manager may learn about an organization’s hierarchy, its unique 
buying processes, the backgrounds and biases of decision makers, and such.  Likewise, in 
a product development team context, the product development manager may learn about 
a customer’s innovation process, its systems for applications engineering, the roles and 
responsibilities of different members of the customer’s R&D team and so on.   
Like the extant literature on transaction specific investments, we recognize that 
mTSIs made by an agent of the firm in a customer relationship makes them vulnerable to 
customer opportunism.  However, because the investing agent is locked-in to the 
customer relationship (e.g., Ganesan 1994), we argue that s/he also becomes concerned 
with internal opportunism by his/her own specialists.  The concern for opportunism by 
specialists emerges for two reasons.  First, mTSIs carry with them certain value creating 
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(or “pie-expansion”) properties (Ghosh and John 1999; Jap 1999).  For instance, prior 
research suggests that TSIs can lead to joint action between exchange partners, which can 
increase utility for both parties (Heide and John 1990).  Thus, an account manager who 
invests heavily in learning a customer’s unique challenges and needs, for example, is 
better positioned to offer superior solutions that create value for both the customer as well 
as to her/himself.  Second, mTSIs can minimize costs of exchange (Ghosh and John 
1999).  For instance, an account manager who invests in learning a customer’s unique 
buying policies and procedures is likely to save time and effort negotiating subsequent 
contracts with this customer.  These arguments suggest that an investing agent is likely to 
be concerned with others who might try to opportunistically exploit or jeopardize the 





























THEORY and HYPOTHESES 
 
 As stated previously, the extent to which an agent’s mTSIs lead to higher 
concerns for internal opportunism rests on important contingency factors (Crosno and 
Dahlstrom 2007; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  First, we draw on Williamson’s 
(e.g., 1985) work on promotion incentives to illustrate how a specialist’s promotion 
aspirations help shape the relationship between an agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for 
internal opportunism.  Second, we draw on past literature (e.g., Heide and Miner 1992; 
Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003) to introduce and show how two new forms of 
extendedness – agent-customer extendedness and specialist-customer extendedness – can 
differentially affect the mTSIs–concern for internal opportunism relationship.  In 
subsequent sections we argue that if an agent’s concern for opportunism is not 
sufficiently curbed, s/he will engage in internal safeguarding behaviors, which can be 
detrimental to performance. 
 
4.1 Promotion Aspirations of Specialists 
Promotion aspirations of specialists refers to the extent to which agents perceive their 
specialists to be motivated to advance into higher-level positions within the firm 
(Tharenou 2001).  We suggest that the promotion aspirations of specialists can signal 
important information to agents who seek to claim value from their mTSIs.  This 
approach is consistent with research suggesting that beliefs about coworker motivations 
can significantly influence group processes (Kim 2003). 
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 Williamson argues that promotion incentives are a key reason why hierarchies can 
attenuate internal opportunism (e.g., Williamson 1985).  The rationale is that promotion 
incentives reduce a firm’s moral hazard problem.  At the individual level, research 
suggests that when promotion incentives are strong, individual effort increases (Drago 
and Garvey 1998).  More importantly, when individuals have aspirations for promotion, 
they tend to be motivated in working with team members to attain team objectives (need 
cite).  Indeed, promotion-aspiring specialists are more likely to go above and beyond to 
help the account manager claim value in order to enhance their chances of attaining the 
promotion they desire (need cite).  Therefore, agents who make mTSIs in a customer 
relationship should be less fearful that a promotion-aspiring specialist will jeopardize this 
value by acting opportunistically.  It is more likely, therefore, that an account manager 
will sense difficulties in claiming value from his/her mTSIs because non-promotion-
aspiring specialists are likely to be viewed as more prone to act opportunistically.  
Formally,  
H1: The relationship between an agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for internal 
opportunism is less positive when the promotion aspirations of his/her specialists 




Extendedness1 is defined as the expectation of indefinite future interactions between 
exchange partners (e.g., Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  In the channels literature, 
extendedness has generally been shown to be beneficial to interfirm relationships because 
it engenders greater cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Heide and Miner 1992; Parkhe 1993), 
                         
1 In the marketing literature, extendedness has also been referred to as long-term orientation (e.g., Lusch 
and Brown 1996) and expectation of continuity (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1989; Heide and John 1990; 
Noordewier et al. 1990). 
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higher levels of trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989) and more relational behavior (Lusch 
and Brown 1996). 
 In the present study, however, our focus in on the individual level of analysis and 
as such, new and different forms of extendedness can emerge.  We introduce two forms 
of extendedness – agent-customer extendedness and specialist-customer extendedness – 
and suggest that they can impact the relationship between mTSIs and concern for internal 
opportunism in countervailing ways. 
Agent-Customer Extendedness.  Agent-customer extendedness refers to the extent to 
which an agent foresees having indefinite future interactions with a particular customer 
(cf. Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  We argue that agent-customer extendedness 
moderates the relationship between an agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for internal 
opportunism.2 
 As previously discussed, mTSIs have the ability to create value for the agent.  
Correspondingly, when agent-customer extendedness is high (i.e., the agent expects a 
long-term relationship with the customer), the agent has the opportunity to claim value 
from her investments on a long-term and, perhaps, even on a recurring basis.  
Consequently, the potential to reap long-term benefits should increase the perceived net 
present value of his/her mTSIs.  Therefore, the investing agent is likely to be more 
concerned about whether others will act opportunistically and jeopardize this long-term 
                         
2 Prior research suggests that TSIs can lead to greater expectations of continuity (i.e., extendedness) (Heide 
and John 1990).  We suggest, however, that this relationship may not be as straightforward as presumed.  
For instance, consider an account manager who is promoted to a new sales territory.  She may have an 
extended view of her new set of customer accounts, but is yet to make a significant investment of 
specialized time and effort with these accounts.  Alternatively, consider the case of many government 
contracts.  An account manager may make significant mTSIs in developing a winning bid even though he 
foresees little future opportunity with this government entity (i.e., the transaction may be considered a 
“one-and-done” transaction).  Thus, we treat extendedness as a moderator variable, which is consistent with 




value claiming opportunity (cf. Ghosh and John 1999).  We also suggest that an agent 
with an extended customer relationship needs to contend with the residual effects of 
actions taken by others – i.e., “live with the consequences” of behaviors by his/her 
specialists.  Thus, an agent who makes mTSIs becomes more sensitive to the potential of 
dealing with residual expenses associated with the long-term fallout of an opportunistic 
specialist.   
 Alternatively, when agent-customer extendedness is low (i.e., the agent expects a 
short-term relationship with the customer), the agent has less ability to claim value on a 
long-term basis.  Overall, compared to when extendedness is high, the agent is likely to 
perceive less value in his/her mTSIs and, therefore, be less concerned about others 
jeopardizing the value of his/her mTSIs by acting opportunistically.  Formally,  
H2: The relationship between an agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for internal 
opportunism is more positive when agent-customer extendedness is higher rather 
than lower. 
 
Notably, this hypothesis extends the extant firm-level view which suggests that 
extendedness between firms should work to reduce the positive impact of TSIs on 
external (or customer) opportunism (e.g., Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  Our 
perspective takes this argument a step further by suggesting that extendedness between 
the agent and the customer should exacerbate the positive relationship between an 
agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for internal opportunism by his/her specialists. 
Specialist-Customer Extendedness.  Specialist-customer extendedness refers to the extent 
to which an agent expects that his/her specialist(s) will have indefinite future interactions 
with a particular customer.  In contrast to the effects of agent-customer extendedness, we 
argue that the positive impact of an agent’s mTSIs on his/her concern for internal 
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opportunism will be lessened when his/her internal collaborators have an extended 
relationship with the customer.  Thus, the relationship is flipped when one considers 
specialist-customer extendedness (as opposed to agent-customer extendedness).  
 When a specialist has an extended relationship with a customer, s/he is more 
likely to derive value from maintaining a cooperative relationship with the customer 
(Heide and Miner 1992; Murnighan and Roth 1983).  Therefore, the specialist is likely to 
behave in ways that will ensure the continuation of his/her relationship with the customer.  
One important way for a specialist to ensure the continuation of his/her customer 
relationship is to not act opportunistically towards those who manage the relationship 
with the customer (i.e., the agent or account manager).  Therefore, an agent who makes 
value creating mTSIs is less likely to worry about opportunistic behaviors by specialists 
when the specialist has an extended relationship with the customer.   On the other hand, 
when a specialist does not have an extended relationship with a customer, s/he may care 
less about trust and cooperation with the customer (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Heide and 
Miner 1992).  As a consequence, a specialist has less incentive to behave in ways that 
will preserve his/her relationship with the customer, which should increase an investing 
agent’s concerns for internal opportunism by the specialist.  Formally,  
H3: The relationship between an agent’s mTSIs and his/her concern for internal 
opportunism is less positive when specialist-customer extendedness is higher 








4.3 Internal safeguarding 
In concert with TCA’s theoretical underpinnings, we suggest that an agent will engage in 
internal safeguarding behaviors when concerned with internal opportunism (cf. 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  We define internal safeguarding as an agent’s (in)actions 
aimed at precluding others from accessing information and/or people related to the object 
of his/her investments (e.g., customer information and/or customer employees).  For 
instance, an account manager might try to ‘block’ information to potential internal 
opportunists by providing customer information to his/her specialists on a need to know 
basis (cf. Kohli 1989).  Such behavior alleviates the threat of internal opportunism by, for 
example, reducing the ability of specialists to take undue credit for business developed by 
the account manager.  This line of reasoning is consistent with Heide and John (1988), 
who argue that manufacturers’ representatives respond to vulnerability to opportunism 
from their principal by taking actions to offset this vulnerability (e.g., by making 
offsetting investments in their customer relationships). 




4.4 Performance with customer  
Account managers who engage in internal safeguarding block information and access to 
specialists regarding their customer accounts.  By blocking information, an agent reduces 
the opportunity to share and to integrate important customer information with his/her 
specialists, which can be critical for better performance with customers.  For instance, 
sharing customer information with specialists should increase the likelihood of 
uncovering new opportunities that can increase the customer ‘pie’ for the firm (Jap 1999).  
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Corresponding research from new product development teams suggests that sharing and 
integrating information is essential because it can increase product quality (Sethi 2000).  
It follows, therefore, that the firm’s performance with a particular customer is likely to 
benefit when its account manager does not engage in internal safeguarding behaviors. 












































5.1 Sample and Survey Procedure 
We enlisted a Fortune 500 business-to-business reseller of office equipment to participate 
in this study.  This company integrates technologies and products from a variety of 
different manufacturers to provide solutions to its customers.  To provide these solutions, 
it utilizes a generalist-specialist approach to selling; that is, it maintains an in-house 
salesforce of generalists (i.e., account managers) who are responsible for creating and 
maintaining customer relationships.  These account managers call upon their in-house 
product/technical specialists (who have deeper, vertical knowledge of specific 
products/technologies) to assist them in developing integrative customer solutions.    
Working with senior management of the firm, we identified and emailed a link to 
an online survey to all 350 account managers from three of the firm’s U.S.-based 
divisions.  The survey instructed the account managers to think about the last customer 
they called on for which they actually used (or could have used) their specialists to help 
them in their selling effort.   
 This approach is preferred for three main reasons.  First, it required the account 
manager to randomly select one of their customers (i.e., the last customer they called on).  
Second, by requesting the last customer they called on, there should be little recall 
difficulties for the account managers.  Third, it was important to have variance on internal 
safeguarding.  Therefore, the process of specifying customers “for which they actually 
used (or could have used) their specialists” engendered responses regarding customers for 
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which the account managers had various degrees of internal safeguarding.  The account 
managers were then asked to complete a questionnaire with respect to this particular 
customer.   
To boost response rates, we incentivized the account managers with $10 
amazon.com gift cards.  We received exactly 175 responses within two weeks for a 50% 
response rate.  After receiving the completed surveys, we tailored the account managers’ 
supervisor surveys to include the name of the customer that the account manager had 
responded to.  We then asked the supervisors to complete the internal safeguarding and 
performance questionnaire with respect to only this account manager and this particular 
customer.  Supervisors were incentivized with $15 amazon.com gift cards.  Of the 175 
supervisor surveys, we received 160 responses from the supervisors within two weeks 
(91% response rate).   
Because some account managers shared the same supervisor, the supervisor was 
often required to complete more than one survey (the minimum number of surveys any 
supervisor responded to was 1 and the maximum was 9; the average was 4.02 surveys per 
supervisor).  Therefore, care was taken to minimize the burden on supervisors in order to 
maximize response rates and to obtain accurate information.  We did this by including 
only fifteen questions per supervisor survey (twelve items are applicable to this study: 
five performance items, six internal safeguarding items and one familiarity-with-the-
customer item).  We eliminated 2 supervisor surveys with customer familiarity scores of 
1 (on a 1-5 scale, with 1 indicating ‘very unfamiliar’ and 5 indicating ‘very familiar’; the 
overall mean manager familiarity score was 3.96 with a standard deviation of .99) and 3 
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account manager surveys due to excessive yeh/neh saying.  Therefore, the overall number 
of matched pairs of account manager and supervisor data is 155.   
 Although it is inherently more difficult to utilize the preceding procedures, we did 
so for two main reasons.  First, by obtaining the predictor variables and the dependent 
variables from different sources, we reduce concerns for common respondent bias 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003).  Second, we reduce concerns of social desirability bias by 
obtaining data on internal safeguarding behaviors of account managers and performance 
from the account managers’ supervisors. 
 
5.2 Measures 
In all cases, we either adapted or were guided by existing measurement scales.  All 
measurement items can be found in Appendix A.  Other summary statistics (correlations, 














Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. micro Transaction specific investments  .80             
2. Extendedness between account 
manager and customer .36a .96            
3. Extendedness between specialist(s) and 
customer -.13 .15 .97           
4. Promotion aspirations of specialist(s) .16 .01 .04 .73          
5. Management monitoring -.01 .07 .11 .11 .77         
6. Goal incongruity between account 
manager and specialist(s) .27a .04 -.54a -.05 -.30a .89        
7. Sales experience of account manager .08 .16 -.17b .07 -.15 .15 n/a       
8. Benevolence of specialist(s) -.06 .08 .59a .16b .21a -.60a -.17b .95      
9. Competence of specialist(s) .07 .12 .57a .25a .21a -.52a -.11 .61a .94     
10. Number of specialists in sales team .25a .15 -.05 .20b .10 .13 .20b .02 .03 n/a    
11. Agent’s concern for specialist 
opportunism .15 -.05 -.48a -.15 -.28a .64a .01 -.64a -.54a .08 .95   
12. Internal safeguarding .06 .11 -.03 .03 -.29a .24a .21a -.20b -.09 -.05 .27a .81  
13. Performance with customer .09 .26a -.01 -.04 .17b .02 .07 .07 .04 .11 -.02 -.19b .91 
              
Mean 3.76 4.41 3.08 3.04 3.08 2.48 12.31 3.39 4.13 3.82 2.01 2.59 3.59 
Standard deviation .87 .87 1.20 .85 .91 1.09 9.73 1.14 .95 2.59 .97 .92 .89 
Composite reliability .80 .96 .97 .77 .78 .90 n/a .96 .95 n/a .95 .81 .91 
Average variance extracted .51 .92 .94 .63 .51 .74 n/a .88 .85 n/a .72 .52 .68 
asignificant at .01 (2-tailed) 
bsignificant at .05 (2-tailed) 
 
* Note: Cronbach’s alphas are on the diagonal of the correlation matrix 
micro-Transaction-Specific Investments.  We use pre-existing scales to develop a 
scale of micro-transaction-specific investments.  This scale needed to be adapted for the 
following two reasons.  First, mTSIs are generally more intangible in nature (e.g., time 
and effort) than the tangible firm-level investments often referred to in other studies (e.g., 
tooling and equipment).  Second, prior TSI scales are at the firm level of analysis and 
thus, the referent is usually ‘we’ or ‘our’.  It was necessary, therefore, to tailor the items 
and the referent to the individual level of analysis.  The scale consists of five items and 
are consistent with several TSI scales used at the firm level of analysis (e.g., Anderson 
and Weitz 1992; Heide and John 1988). 
Concern for internal opportunism.  In contrast to prior scales which measure 
actual external opportunism, we adapted our scale to reflect one’s concern for internal 
opportunism.  We adapted and augmented the four-item partner opportunism scale from 
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005) by including four new items.  We added four items because 
this construct is of central interest and because opportunism in team-based contexts 
generally consists of behaviors such as shirking and/or freeriding (e.g., Jones 1984), 
which are less prevalent in prior firm-level opportunism scales.  All the items in this scale 
are tailored to elicit the account manager’s concern for opportunism by his/her 
product/technical specialists.  (Wathne and Heide (2000) distinguish between passive 
(e.g., shirking) and active (e.g., deliberately lying) opportunism.  Initial exploratory factor 
analysis, however, resulted in only one underlying concern for internal opportunism 
factor.)   
Internal safeguarding.  We assess internal safeguarding behaviors from the 
account managers’ supervisors.  This new six-item scale reflects the extent to which the 
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account manager blocks access to and information regarding a particular customer.  In 
constructing this scale, we used the existing literature to aid us.  For instance, we use the 
information integration scale used by Sethi (2000) as input in our delineation and 
construction of the measurement items.   
Performance with customer.  We assess the firm’s performance with the particular 
customer from the account managers’ supervisors by adapting the established scale of 
Homburg et al. (2002).  Importantly, we specify that the supervisor respond to these 
questions regarding the particular customer relationship that the account manager used to 
respond to his/her questionnaire (i.e., the account manager’s performance might vary 
considerably across different customers).  
 Extendedness.  We adapt the scale used by Jap and Anderson (2003) to assess 
both the extendedness between the account manager and the customer and the 
extendedness between the account managers’ specialists and the customer.  These items 
have considerable overlap with other extendedness scales in the literature (e.g., Heide and 
Miner 1992; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003). 
 Promotion aspirations of specialist(s).  To assess the promotion aspirations of the 
account managers’ specialists, we adapted four items from the original thirteen item 
managerial aspirations scale which best tap the different aspects of the construct 
(Tharenou 2001). 
 Control variables.  We control for several variables that prior research and theory 
suggest are related to the theoretical constructs of interest in the present study.  First, we 
control for two types of trust that account managers have with their specialists – 
benevolence and competence (Ganesan 1994).  An account manager is likely to be less 
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concerned with opportunism from a benevolent specialist; therefore we assess specialist 
benevolence via the four-item benevolence scale from Becerra and Gupta (2003).  An 
account manager is also more likely to seek advice from competent others and, therefore, 
is less likely to be concerned with specialist opportunism (Tushman and Scanlan 1981).  
We control for specialist competence via Kohli and Jaworski’s  (1994) five-item co-
worker competence scale. 
 Second, we account for team size (via the number of specialists working with the 
customer) because larger teams increase the ability of team members to act 
opportunistically (i.e., shirk, freeride) (Jones 1984).  Third, we control for the account 
manager’s sales experience (in years).  Experienced account managers are likely less 
dependent upon their specialists for help and, therefore, choose to include them less 
frequently in their customer accounts (i.e., internally safeguard).  
 Finally, as per agency theory, we control for (a) goal incongruity between account 
managers and their specialists and (b) monitoring by management – both of which are 
purported to affect opportunism (Anderson 1988).  We adapted the three-item goal 
incongruity scale used by Song and colleagues (2000) to assess goal incongruity between 
the account manager and his/her specialists.  Importantly, we specify that the responses 
should be with respect this customer relationship (because goals may be more or less 
aligned across different customers).  Monitoring by management should increase the 
ability to detect opportunism and, therefore, should reduce the account manager’s 
concern for specialists’ opportunism (Stump and Heide 1996; Wathne and Heide 2000).  
Therefore, we adapted and augmented the management monitoring scale used by Sethi 
and colleagues (2001) to fit the present context.   
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5.3 Construct Validity 
We follow Gerbing and Anderson (1988) to test the validity of our measures using 
confirmatory factor analysis.  Using LISREL 8.54 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996), we 
assess the fit of a single overarching measurement model for all constructs (including all 
control variables, except for years of sales experience and the number of specialists 
working with the customer) across both respondents (i.e., the account managers and their 
supervisors) (n = 155).  Given these constraints, the model exhibits excellent fit (χ2 = 
1170.49, d.f. = 687; χ2/d.f. = 1.70 (i.e., less than 2); CFI = .90; RMSEA = 0.065; SRMR 
= 0.067). 
The measurement items all load significantly on their latent factors (lowest t-
value was 6.59 for item three of the management monitoring scale), demonstrating 
convergent validity.  All coefficient alphas surpass the recommended reliability threshold 
of .70 (Nunnally 1978).  Correspondingly, all composite reliabilities (CR), meet the 
recommended cut-off level of .70.  In addition, the average variance extracted (AVE) of 
all variables meet or exceed the recommended standard of .50 (Fornell and Larker 1981).  
Consequently, there is strong evidence that the items are internally consistent.  Finally, 
we assess discriminant validity using the procedures outlined by Fornell and Larcker 
(1981).  Specifically, the shared variance between all possible pairs of constructs is less 
than the AVE for all individual constructs.  Thus, we provide evidence of 










ANALYSIS and RESULTS 
To test our hypotheses (Figure 1) we following Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and 
simultaneously assess the measurement and structural models using LISREL 8.80.  To 
test interactions between multiple indicant latent variables (i.e., H1 and H2 ), we utilize 
the procedures outlined by Marsh, Wen, and Hau (2004) and Ping (1995).  The 
unconstrained approach (Marsh, Wen, and Hau 2004) suggests mean centering the 
indicators and using a matching system when creating the indicators of the latent 
interaction variables.  A matching system has two main benefits (1) it does not reuse 
information (i.e., item 1 from an independent variable is not multiplied by multiple items 
from the moderator variable) and (2) it uses all of the information (i.e., all items between 
the two constructs are used in creating the interaction variables).  Therefore, we 
multiplied the first two items of the mTSIs scale by the two agent-customer extendedness 
items and the last two items of the mTSIs scale by the two specialist-customer 
extendedness items to form two indicators for each of the two interaction variables.   
 As a check on the results of the unconstrained approach, we also used the two-
step procedure outline by Ping (1995).  The Ping approach uses a single indicant of the 
latent interaction variables; however, the results are largely consistent across both 
approaches.   
 Table 2 reports the results of the structural equations and model fit.  As expected, 
our results suggest that the relationship between mTSIs and concern for internal 
opportunism is moderated by the extendedness between the account manager and the 
customer (γ = .20, p ≤ .05), supporting H1.  Specifically, this result suggests that the 
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relationship between mTSIs and concern for internal opportunism becomes more positive 
as the extendedness between the account manager and the customer increases.  H2 is also 
supported (γ = -.22, p ≤ .05).  That is, as the extendedness between specialists and the 
customer increases, the relationship between mTSIs and concern for internal opportunism 
is less positive.  Thus, we provide evidence that these two types of extendedness can have 
countervailing effects on the mTSIs – concern for internal opportunism relationship.   
 Our results also support H3, which predicts a positive relationship between 
concern for internal opportunism and internal safeguarding (β = .30, p ≤ .001).  This 
finding lends credibility to notion that account managers will take steps to “block” others 
when they are concerned with internal opportunism.  This is congruent with Heide and 
John (1988), who find that agencies will take action (by making offsetting investments in 
their customers) when concerned with opportunism by their principals. 
 Consistent with our prediction, our results suggest that internal safeguarding can 
have deleterious effects on performance (β = -.22, p ≤ .01), providing support for H4.  
Thus, managers may be keen to the notion that those account managers who engage in 




























CIOP mTSIs Int. Safe. Perf. 
mTSIs:   micro Transaction Specific Investments made by account manager in customer 
ExtAM-Cust:  Extendedness between the account manager and the customer 
ExtSpec-Cust:  Extendedness between the account manager’s specialists (teammates) and the customer 
CIOP:  Concern for internal opportunism 
Int. Safe.: Internal safeguarding 


















Tests of Hypotheses  
 









mTSIs x ExtAM-cust  H1 + .20 p < .05 
mTSIs x ExtSpec-cust  H2 - -.22 p < .05 
mTSIs    .18 p < .05 
ExtAM-cust   .08 ns 
ExtSpec-cust   .52 p < .001 
Benevolence*  .69 p < .001 
Concern for internal 
opportunism 
Monitoring*   .21 p < .025 
 
β paths 
Concern for internal opportunism H3 + .30 p < .001 
Benevolence*  -.04 ns 
Internal safeguarding 
Monitoring*   -.24 p < .025 
 
       
Internal safeguarding H4 - -.22 p < .01 Performance 
Monitoring*   .15 p < .05 
 
       
 
Model fit: χ2(618) = 1139.02 (p < .01), CFI = .93 , RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .087 
ns = not significant 
* = control variable 
 















 Transaction-specific investments, opportunism and governance mechanisms 
examined at the firm level of analysis have significantly improved our understanding of 
interfirm relationships (e.g., Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  The present research 
extends this literature stream by illuminating the individual investors of TSIs, concerns 
for internal opportunism and internal safeguarding.  Notably, our research suggests that 
one’s mTSIs in a customer relationship can lead to a greater concern for internal 
opportunism under certain conditions.  We show that this concern can lead to internal 
safeguarding behaviors that are incongruent with the team concept and consequently, 
negatively affect performance.  The results of this research provide important 
implications for theory and practice. 
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
Using established theory, our research highlights new, important variables and 
relationships that can significantly affect a firm’s performance with its customers.  First, 
we underscore the important role that transaction-specific investments made by agents of 
the firm (i.e., mTSIs) can play in collaborative contexts.  In doing so, our research 
complements and extends extant firm-level perspectives.  For instance, prior research 
suggests that extendedness between firms can reduce the impact that TSIs have on the 
receiving firm’s opportunism (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).  Our research takes 
this notion a step further by showing that high levels of agent-customer extendedness and 
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low levels of specialist-customer extendedness increase the impact that an agent’s mTSIs 
have on his/her concern for internal opportunism (by non-recipients of the investments).  
Thus, we suggest that at more micro-levels of analysis there can be different types of 
extendedness and that these different types of extendedness can impact the relationship 
between mTSIs and concern for internal opportunism in interesting, countervailing ways.   
  Second, prior related research tends to focus on interorganizational governance 
and, as a consequence, internal governance mechanisms (such as promotion incentives) 
have taken a back seat in the literature.  Presumably, promotion incentives should work to 
attenuate internal opportunism (Williamson 1985).  We shed light on this under 
researched assumption by examining the extent to which specialists are motivated to be 
promoted (i.e., their promotion aspirations).  Thus, we suggest that it may not be the 
presence or absence of promotion incentives per se, but rather the underlying motivation 
for a promotion that can guide behavior (or, as in our case, guide one’s perceptions of 
another’s likely behavior).  Our results suggest that agents who make mTSIs in their 
customer relationships are more concerned with internal opportunism when their 
specialists have little motivation to be promoted.  Thus, although there may be promotion 
opportunities within firms, individuals may be more or less concerned about a 
teammate’s behavior depending upon whether this teammate is perceived to be motivated 
to be promoted. 
 Third, we identify a key consequence of internal opportunism – internal 
safeguarding behaviors – and show how it can adversely affect performance.  Although 
prior research provides considerable insights into the antecedents of external (or 
interfirm) opportunism (e.g., Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; 
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Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003), an understanding of the consequences of opportunism 
has been conspicuously absent in the literature.  Additionally, unlike much of the extant 
research which illustrates the positive consequences of external safeguards such as 
relational norms (e.g., Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Jap and 
Ganesan 2000), we argue and show that internal safeguarding behaviors by agents can 
have deleterious effects on a firm’s performance with its customers. 
 Fourth, our research explicitly measures and assesses one’s concerns for 
opportunism rather than actual opportunism.  Although the marketing literature tends to 
focus on actual opportunism (e.g., John 1984; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003), 
Williamson suggests (1985) that it is difficult to know a priori who and when others will 
behave opportunistically.  We suggest that this uncertainty can manifest itself in higher or 
lower concerns for opportunism, which can then lead to safeguarding behaviors.  In 
addition, because actual opportunism can to lead to self-selection out of a relationship 
and/or may be attenuated in self-reports (Crosno and Dahlstrom 2007), we suggest that 
assessing concerns for opportunism provides not only a theoretical contribution, but also 
a fruitful area for further research.    
 Finally, we strengthen our results by controlling for a number of important 
covariates.  For instance, most prior studies on opportunism do not include trust as a 
covariate (perhaps, because some suggest that trust is “psychological converse” of 
opportunism (Parkhe 1993, p. 803)).  Our results, however, suggest that trust may reduce 
concerns with internal opportunism, but that these concerns can significantly relate to 




7.2 Managerial Implications 
Account managers are encouraged/expected to use available internal resources (e.g., their 
product and technical specialists) to cultivate and to strengthen their relationships with 
their customers.  In this paper, we demonstrate that account managers are often cautious 
about utilizing these internal resources, for fear of opportunistic behaviors by these 
resources.  Clearly, it behooves managers to find ways to reduce account managers’ 
concerns for internal opportunism. 
 To reduce an account manager’s concern for internal opportunism, managers 
should find ways to signal specialists’ continued involvement with a customer (i.e., 
increase specialist-customer extendedness).  There are at least two ways to do this.  First, 
managers should consider assigning specialists to customers, rather than only to account 
managers (in the present context, specialists are assigned to account managers, while 
account managers are assigned to customers).  This should increase a specialist’s sense of 
attachment to and prolonged involvement with particular customers.  Second, managers 
should consider making explicit the role of specialists in customer feedback (in the 
present context, customer feedback is based on the account managers specifically and the 
firm generally).  Therefore, specialists would have a greater incentive to maintain good 
customer relationships on a long-term basis.   
 Our results also suggest that agent-customer extendedness can increase an 
investing agent’s concerns for internal opportunism.  Therefore, to offset concerns for 
opportunism, managers should (a) monitor account managers with more extended 
customer relationships (e.g., key account managers) and those specialists assigned to 
them and (b) encourage team-building activities between these account managers and 
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their specialists.  Alternatively, managers can be more efficient by spending less time 
monitoring those accounts with short time horizons, as our findings suggest that account 
managers are less concerned with internal opportunism and, therefore, more likely to 
include their specialists in these accounts (as one executive put it – in “one-and-done 
type” transactions). 
 Managers also need to understand that the promotion aspirations of specialists 
matter in internal collaborative contexts.  Our results suggest that account managers are 
likely to be more concerned that their value creating investments are at risk of internal 
opportunism when his/her specialists are not motivated to be promoted.  Therefore, 
managers may choose to hire specialists who signal very high aspirational levels for 
moving up the corporate ladder.  Managers of current employees should pay particular 
attention to a specialist’s age or tenure because prior research shows that age is 
negatively related to the valence for promotion (Cron, Dubinsky, and Michaels 1988).  
Thus, account managers may consider older and/or longer-tenured specialists to not be 
motivated to be promoted, which can increase their concerns for opportunism.   
 This finding regarding the promotion aspirations of specialists was very 
interesting to senior management at the participating firm because it also presents 
somewhat of a conundrum for managers.  On the one hand, managers want to hire 
specialists who will to do a specific job for at least a minimum length of time.  On the 
other hand, our results suggest that investing account managers are more concerned with 
internal opportunism when their specialists do not aspire to be promoted.  Therefore, to 
the extent that account managers equate long job continuity of specialists to low 
 36 
 
promotion aspirations of these specialists, managers will need to balance the benefits of 
specialists’ job continuity with the potential pitfalls of such continuity. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
The present research has the following limitations.  First, we collected data from a single 
firm and industry.  Future research will be needed, to assess the overall generalizability of 
our contentions to other contexts.  For instance, promotion-based incentives are more 
likely to be used in large corporations with many hierarchical levels (such as the one 
examined in the present study).  Thus, our results may not generalize to smaller firms 
with fewer promotion opportunities (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988).  Second, the 
scale for promotion aspirations of specialists needs to be improved.  We utilized only 
four of the most applicable items from Tharenou’s (2001) original thirteen-item 
promotional aspiration scale; therefore, future researchers should try to incorporate 
and/or adapt other items from her scale.   
 
7.4 Future Research Directions 
There are considerable opportunities to extend the current research.  For instance, 
research is needed to understand how established firm-level governance mechanisms 
(e.g., norms, qualification efforts) (e.g., Heide and John 1992; Jap and Ganesan 2000; 
Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003; Stump and Heide 1996; Wathne and Heide 2004) 
work within the context of team-based collaborative arrangements.  An interesting study 
would be whether extreme forms of solidarity between account managers and their 
specialists might actually create a moral hazard for the customer.  In other words, 
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customers may be concerned that closely knit teams are more likely to take advantage of 
them.  Thus, although there may be benefits to team solidarity (e.g., cohesion, 
motivation), there may also be detriments.   
 More research is also needed to better understand the role of internal promotions.  
Although prior research suggests that “Promotions are used as the primary incentive 
device in most organizations, including corporations, partnerships, and universities” 
(Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988, p. 600),  there is little corresponding research in the 
marketing literature.  Rather, research generally focuses on controlling employees via 
outcome or behavior control mechanisms (e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987).  A close 
examination of internal promotions could make a significant contribution because such 
an incentive device can induce motivation and effort by a large number of employees 
while offering only a single reward (Prendergast 1999; Rosenbaum 1984; Takahashi 
2006).  Such an endeavor, however, should account for the notion that when promotion 
incentives are strong, cooperation among participants (including potential teammates) 
may be reduced (Drago and Garvey 1998; Lazear 1989), which may hurt performance in 
collaborative contexts. 
 Additionally, research is needed to understand whether offsetting investments 
made by specialists in a customer creates a ‘mutual lock-in condition’ with the account 
manager (Heide and John 1988).  Such a condition is likely to reduce an investing agent’s 
concerns for internal opportunism by his/her specialists.  As we show in our study, 
however, an agent who is concerned with internal opportunism is likely to block others 
from accessing the customer account, which may prevent a specialist from making mTSIs 
in the customer.  Therefore, future research would need to take this ‘chicken and the egg’ 
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argument into consideration (i.e., Does internal safeguarding prevent mTSIs by 
specialists? or Do offsetting mTSIs by specialists lower the agent’s concern for 
opportunism and, consequently, lower his/her internal safeguarding?) 
.   Correspondingly, research is needed to address the directionality of mTSIs among 
team members.  For instance, specialists are likely to have made significant, specific 
investments in learning the unique applications of specific products/technologies (i.e., 
employer-specific investments), whereas account managers are likely to have made 
significant investments in their customer relationships.  The literature would benefit from 
an examination of how the directionality of mTSIs among team members affects critical 
team variables.  
 An additional future study should examine the extent to which actual opportunism 
increases one’s concern for opportunism or vice-versa.  Indeed, some suggest that, 
“Individuals, treated with suspicion and on the expectation that given the opportunity 
they will cheat, may be induced to behave in the postulated manner” (Moschandreas 
1997, p. 47).   
 Finally, the non-redeployability characteristic of mTSIs raises other interesting 
issues.  For instance, agents who make mTSIs are likely to be very concerned with 
his/her internal reputation (Hirshleifer 1993).  In other words, because the investments 
are non-redeployable, s/he will have a heightened awareness of how his/her mTSIs are 










DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS: THE 
CONCURRENT ROLE OF NETWORKS WITHIN AND BETWEEN BUYING 














































INTRODUCTION TO PART 2 
 
 Recent research suggests that sellers and buyers jointly play integral roles in 
developing and deploying effective customer solutions (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 
2007).  As such, members of both selling and buying teams are often responsible for co-
creating and assuring effective implementation of customer solutions (Dhar, Menon, and 
Maach 2004).  Apart from qualitative case studies, prior business-to-business marketing 
research tends to examine selling and buying teams in isolation, leaving the natural 
bridge between these two counterparts uncrossed to date.  Consequently, there is little 
research which concurrently examines how intrafirm (e.g., within both the selling and 
buying teams) and interfirm (between the selling and buying teams) linkages jointly 
affect the effectiveness of customer solutions at both the solution development and 
deployment phases.  This omission is noteworthy because the ultimate effectiveness of 
within-team characteristics, for example, may be contingent upon between-team 
characteristics.  Thus, the overarching research question we pursue in this paper is the 
following, “How do the relations within teams combine with the relations and structure 
between teams to enhance the effectiveness of a complex customer solution at both the 
solution development phase and the solution deployment phase?”  To answer this 
question, we draw on and integrate perspectives from network theory and agency theory.   
The present research makes two central contributions.  First, the implicit 
assumption in the literature is that strong relational ties between network members, 
generally speaking, have very positive effects.  However, to date, there is little 
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understanding about whether strong ties between teams, for example, compliment or 
substitute for strong ties within teams or whether strong ties are needed at both the 
solution development and the solution deployment phases.  These notions are of 
particular consequence because strong relational ties within and between teams can be 
very costly to develop and maintain (Hansen 1999).  Therefore, from an efficiency and 
practical standpoint, it behooves managers to understand whether, where and when to 
encourage strong ties (e.g., within and/or between teams; at the development and/or the 
deployment phase). 
Second, we extend the emerging view on the importance of the structural aspects 
of interfirm relationships by focusing on the structure of relations between buying and 
selling teams (Wuyts et al. 2004).  Specifically, we introduce the concepts of mirrored 
ties (i.e., ties between a network member and similar others -- in the present paper, we 
focus on knowledge similarity) and more-than-mirrored ties (i.e., ties between a network 
member and similar others (i.e., mirrored ties) and dissimilar others) to lend clarity and 
context to the preferred network structures between buying and selling teams during both 
the solution development and deployment phases.  In doing so, we attempt to answer two 
important questions - (a) at what stage of the solution process are mirrored ties and more-
than-mirrored ties most beneficial to solution effectiveness?, and (b) to what extent do 
mirrored ties or more-than-mirrored ties between teams interact with tie strength within 
and across teams to affect solution effectiveness? 
Our study also makes several contributions to the emerging literatures on 
customer solutions (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007) and on the effect of social 
networks in marketing contexts (Wuyts et al. 2004).  For instance, we empirically show 
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that concurrent within- and between-team network characteristics (e.g., tie intensity, 
mirrored ties) are critical to solution effectiveness (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007).  In 
doing so, we highlight notable differences in preferred network structures during the 
solution development and solution deployment phases. 
Our research also sheds new light on buying and selling teams.  Although 
empirical work tends to examine these teams in isolation of each other, we show that the 
ability of one team to be effective (e.g., selling team) depends in large part on the 
relational characteristics between teams (e.g., between the buying and selling teams).  
This contribution is particularly timely, given the increasing use and importance of, yet 
paucity of empirical research on, selling teams in practice (Homburg, Workman, and 
Jensen 2002; Weitz and Bradford 1999).   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  First, we underscore important 
theoretical underpinnings and advances for which our subsequent hypotheses are based.  
Second, we formulate a set of hypotheses across both the solution development and 
solution deployment phases.  Third, we provide details of our methodology, which 
includes details of our field-based conjoint study.  Finally, we report our results and 
discuss important theoretical and practical implications as well as provide several areas 
















 Networks have two key characteristics: (1) the configuration of relations among 
network members (i.e., structural embeddedness) and (2) the relationships between 
members in the network (i.e., relational embeddedness) (e.g., Moran 2005).  It is 
important to understand how these network characteristics affect customer solutions at 
different phases of the solution process.  Therefore, we first distinguish between the 
solution development and solution deployment phases using agency theory before 
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9.1 Solution Development and Solution Deployment 
We focus on solution effectiveness at two stages of the solution process: the solution 
development phase and the solution deployment phase.  Effective solution development 
involves buying and selling firms working together to define customer requirements, and 
to customize and integrate the solution to meet customer requirements (Tuli, Kohli, and 
Bharadwaj 2007).  Effective solution deployment, on the other hand, involves effective 
installation and training as well as maximizing the customer’s utilization of the solution 
(Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). Research suggests that being effective in both phases 
of the solution process is needed to be effective from the customer’s point of view (Tuli, 
Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007; Ustuner 2005). 
 Notably, these two phases map onto the agency theory notions of hidden 
information (i.e., adverse selection) and hidden action (i.e., moral hazard) (Bergen, Dutta, 
and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1989).  In the hidden information phase (solution 
development phase), the buying team struggles with information asymmetries between its 
members and members of the selling team.  These information asymmetries increase the 
buying team’s fear that selling team members will misrepresent their abilities to develop 
an effective solution (Eisenhardt 1989).  In response, buying teams rely on screening and 
signals (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).  For instance, frequent communication (i.e., 
intense ties) between the buying and selling teams allows the buying team to screen the 
selling team’s abilities directly.  Frequent communication among selling team members 
signals their ability to work together on the solution.  Thus, overcoming hazards posed by 
information asymmetries via screening and signals should play an integral role in the 
solution development phase. 
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  In the hidden action phase (solution deployment phase), the buying team is 
concerned with selling team member opportunism (e.g., shirking on their training and 
installation duties) (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).  Since the outcomes of these 
activities are difficult to evaluate and predict ex ante, they are more prone to moral 
hazard (Holmstrom 1979).  In response, buying team members will monitor these 
activities in an attempt to reduce opportunism.  For instance, frequent communication 
(i.e., intense ties) between the buying and selling teams allows the buying team to 
monitor the selling team directly.  Thus, overcoming concerns with opportunism via 
monitoring mechanisms should play an integral role in the solution deployment phase 
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).  In the following sections we integrate these notions 
with the tenets of network theory before developing our hypotheses. 
 
9.2 Structural Embeddedness 
Structural embeddedness refers to the pattern of linkages between network members 
(e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  In the present paper, we focus only on the between-
team network structure (i.e., the network structure between the selling and buying teams) 
(see Figure in Appendix).  A central notion of structural embeddedness is network 
density, or, the number of linkages among members (or nodes) of a network.  In this 
study, we extend the established idea of network density by introducing the notions of 
mirrored ties (MTs) and more-than-mirrored ties (MTMTs). 
 As stated previously, mirrored ties are ties between a network member and 
similar others, while more-than-mirrored ties are ties between a network member and 
similar others and dissimilar others.  In the present paper, we focus on knowledge 
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(dis)similarity.  For example, a mirrored tie would be a tie between the account manager 
from the selling team and the purchasing manager from the buying team (i.e., both have 
rather similar knowledge of the purchasing process and of each other’s job roles).  Thus, 
more-than-mirrored ties would include the aforementioned tie between the account 
manager and the purchasing manager (a mirrored tie) as well as a tie between the account 
manager and the I.T. manager within the buying team (a non-mirrored tie).   
 More-than-mirrored tie networks generally have more linkages between selling 
and buying team members than solely mirrored tie networks and, therefore, may be 
considered more dense than mirrored-only tie networks.  As established theory and 
empirical evidence on network density would suggest, more-than-mirrored between-team 
tie networks would exhibit greater opportunity for integration and observability than 
would mirrored-only tie networks (cf. Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).  We elaborate on 
the importance of the distinction between network density and (more-than-) mirrored ties 
below and in subsequent sections.  
Opportunity for Integration.  The opportunity for integration refers to the extent to which 
network members have the opportunity to share and to integrate information with each 
other.  Research suggests that densely connected network members have a greater 
opportunity to transfer information (than if members were only sparsely connected) (Van 
den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).  Such an opportunity makes it more likely that different 
opinions and perspectives will surface and be integrated, which is critical in developing 
effective customer solutions (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007).  For instance, it should 
be beneficial for selling team members to talk to many members of the buying team in 
order to recognize and appreciate different functional challenges and ways of working.  
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Thus, a buying firm is likely to prefer more-than-mirrored ties between the buying and 
selling teams during the solution development phase because more ties should signal 
more opportunities to share and integrate numerous perspectives. 
Observability.  Observability is the extent to which network members’ actions are visible 
to other members of the network.  As network density increases, an individual’s 
behaviors become more observable by network members and, therefore, works to 
attenuate member opportunism (e.g., shirking) (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 2005; Van 
den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).  Correspondingly, Coleman (1988) finds that closed 
networks (densely-knit networks) are more likely to enforce social norms and to engender 
trust among members.  Thus, prior research would suggest that more-than-mirrored ties 
should increase observability and, therefore, work to attenuate opportunism in the 
solution deployment phase.  
 The present study extends this notion by offering a complementary perspective.  
We suggest that more-than-mirrored ties include linkages for which there are high levels 
of information asymmetry (e.g., between the account manager from the selling team and 
the I.T. manager from the buying team).  Therefore, more-than-mirrored ties may do little 
more than mirrored ties to reduce opportunism because of the inherent information 
asymmetries involved in non-mirrored ties.  In other words, non-mirrored ties have less 
ability to detect and, therefore, monitor for opportunism (Wathne and Heide 2000).  
Mirrored-ties, on the other hand, are characterized by information symmetry and, 
therefore, are best able to observe and monitor for opportunism.  Consequently, we argue 
that more-than-mirrored ties may be seen as inefficient in the solution deployment phase, 
ceteris paribus, because of the non-mirrored ties’ inability to observe opportunism.   
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9.3 Relational Embeddedness 
Relational embeddedness refers to the relationships between network members (e.g., 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  The relational features of the network can play significant 
roles in a variety of phenomena such as influence (e.g., Brown and Reingen 1987) and 
information transfer (e.g., Hansen 1999; Reagans and McEvily 2003).  Generally, the 
core ideas of relational embeddedness are captured by the notion of tie strength.  We 
focus on tie intensity, or the frequency of communication between network members, as 
an indicator of tie strength (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007)3.  Like structural 
embeddedness, relational embeddedness can impact effectiveness at both the solution 
development and solution deployment phases.  
Tie Intensity as Information Exchange Mechanism 
Intense ties ease the transfer of complex (Hansen 1999), tacit (Reagans and McEvily 
2003) and private/restricted knowledge (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003).  Correspondingly, 
intense ties can engender a shared language (Maltz and Kohli 1996; Van den Bulte and 
Wuyts 2007) and information processing heuristics (Hansen 1999), which can ease 
communication.  Likewise, intense ties have been found to enhance explorative learning 
(complex learning via experimenting with alternatives) (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003) and 
understanding of formal and informal roles of network members (Spekman and Johnston 
1986).   
                         
3 Research suggests that tie strength consists of two dimensions: tie intensity (the frequency of 
communication) and tie valence (the affective nature of the tie) (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).  We use 
the frequency of interaction between network members as a proxy for tie strength for two main reasons: (1) 
Prior researchers collapse communication frequency and valence because they are highly correlated (e.g., 
Hansen (1999) reports a correlation of .83) (2) Research suggests that complex knowledge transfer, which 
solutions call for, is often done in an iterative fashion (which implies frequent communication) (Van den 
Bulte and Wuyts 2007) 
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 Weak ties (or infrequent communication between network members), on the other 
hand, require little investment in time which results in impersonal (or atomistic) 
relationships, which tend to inhibit information transfer (Uzzi and Lancaster 2003; Van 
den Bulte and Wuyts 2007).  Thus, buying firms should prefer intense ties during the 
solution development phase because such ties can screen directly for selling team 
competence and can signal the ability of network members to share and process complex 
information, which is vital to developing effective solutions.  
Tie Intensity as Governance Mechanism 
There is ample evidence from the marketing literature suggesting that intense ties can 
also govern relationships.  For instance, research suggests that frequent communication 
can increase trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 1990) and 
commitment between exchange partners (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Related research 
suggests that the norm of information sharing can increase commitment (Jap and Ganesan 
2000) and govern against opportunism (Heide and John 1992).  Thus, buying 
organizations should prefer intense ties during the solution deployment phase because 
such ties should (a) reduce concerns for opportunism, thereby reducing the need to 
monitor and/or (b) allow network members to directly monitor each other, thereby 
preventing opportunistic behavior.   
Key Assumptions 
We make three central assumptions in this paper.  First, we assume that all within-team 
members are at least weakly tied to one another (see illustration in the Appendix).  The 
rationale for this is that it is likely that team members from the same firm will at least 
have the opportunity to communicate with each other (i.e., at least weak ties 
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characterized by infrequent communication).  Second, all tie strengths within each team 
are the same and all tie strengths between the buying and the selling team are the same.  
Without this assumption, there would be an inordinate number of combinations of weak 
and strong ties within and between the teams, making the research non-tractable.  Third, 
we assume that transitivity does not hold between teams (i.e., a strong tie from sales team 
member #2 to member #1 and a strong tie between sales team member #1 and member B 
of the buying team does not imply that there needs to be a tie between members #2 and 
B).  Because these teams are often formed on a temporary basis (i.e., they are often task-
specific, ad-hoc teams) for which time commitments among team members are likely to 
































10.1 Tie Intensity within the Selling Team and Tie Intensity between Teams 
To overcome the hidden information problem at the solution development phase, buying 
firms should prefer intense ties among selling team members.  Such ties among selling 
team members should signal the ability to transfer private and tacit information (Reagans 
and McEvily 2003; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003).  Frequent communication among selling 
team members should also increase empathy (Parker and Axtell 2001) which can 
overcome difficulties associated with different “thought worlds” stemming from team 
members who come from different functional areas (Dougherty 1992).  Intense ties 
among selling team members should also increase the team’s ability to work out 
problems “on the fly” (Uzzi 1997).  Such problem solving is important because it helps to 
flesh out requirements, articulate interdependencies across functions and adjust to 
different performance evaluation metrics. 
 As recent research evidences, however, effective solutions are co-created by both 
suppliers and customers (Dhar, Menon, and Maach 2004; Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 
2007).  Therefore, intense ties within the selling team can only go so far in developing 
truly effective solutions.  Effective solution development requires the ability of the 
selling team to not only share and integrate perspectives with each other, but also the 
ability to share and integrate knowledge with members of the buying team.  Intense 
between-team ties, therefore, should signal the ability to transfer the complex and private 
knowledge necessary to learn customer preferences and to co-develop customer solutions 
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(Dhar, Menon, and Maach 2004; Hansen 1999; Reagans and McEvily 2003; Tuli, Kohli, 
and Bharadwaj 2007; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003).  Such ties are also important for learning 
the political and operational procedures of each other’s firms, which recent research 
shows is essential to solution effectiveness (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007).  Intense 
between-team ties, therefore, should foster discussions within the selling team that are 
much more informed by customer preferences and procedures.  Formally,   
 H1a: During the solution development phase, the relationship between intense ties  
 within the selling team and solution effectiveness is more positive when the 
 between-team ties are more intense. 
 
As stated previously, at the solution deployment phase, the onus shifts to monitoring 
against opportunism.  To overcome this hidden action problem, buying firms are likely to 
prefer intense ties among selling team members because such ties should help selling 
team members monitor each other’s behavior (e.g., by ensuring that selling team 
members are communicating with each other about installation and training).  However, 
to the extent that frequent communication increases trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989) and 
commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1992) among selling team members, the customer 
may feel threatened by the team’s solidarity, which permits it to act opportunistically 
without the threat of exposure by individual selling team members.  Frequent 
communication between teams, therefore, should govern sales team member behavior 
because of the increased ability of buying team members to detect selling team 
opportunism (e.g., shirking).  Therefore,  
 H1b: During the solution deployment phase, the relationship between intense ties  
 within the selling team and solution effectiveness is more positive when the 





10.2 Tie Intensity within the Selling Team and Mirrored Ties 
Intense ties should ease the transfer of complex and tacit knowledge among selling team 
members (Hansen 1999; Reagans and McEvily 2003).  Such ties should signal an 
increased likelihood of conceptualizing effective solutions for the customer.  
Corresponding evidence suggests that, “…salespeople who communicated with their 
engineer-contacts more frequently were more effective in solution creation” (Ustuner 
2005, p. 121).  If selling team members communicated only infrequently with one 
another, there is a greater likelihood that components will be misaligned, for example, 
leading to suboptimal solution development (cf. Fichman and Goodman 1996).   
 As stated previously, effective solutions are co-created by both selling teams and 
buying teams (Dhar, Menon, and Maach 2004; Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007) and that 
intense ties within the selling team can only go so far in developing truly effective 
solutions.  Therefore, buying firms are likely to prefer more-than-mirrored ties (MTMT) 
over mirrored ties (MT) between the selling and buying teams.  As prior research 
suggests, more densely-knit networks provide a greater opportunity to surface and 
incorporate different opinions and perspectives (Van den Bulte and Wuyts 2007), which 
is critical in developing effective customer solutions (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). 
 MTMTs, therefore, should impact the ability of tightly-knit selling teams to 
incorporate many different customer perspectives during their (frequent) discussions.  If 
there were only mirrored ties between the selling and buying teams, discussions among 
selling team members are likely to remain in functional silos and not benefit from 
perspectives of other buying team members (Gulati 2007).  Moreover, selling team 
members would receive some information second-hand, relying on their team members to 
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accurately relay information from their (mirrored) counterpart.  Thus, MTMTs between 
teams should signal to purchasing firms that discussions within the selling team are likely 
to benefit from the inclusion of more perspectives and viewpoints from buying team 
members.  Formally,  
 H2a: During the solution development phase, the relationship between intense ties 
 within the selling team and solution effectiveness is more positive when there are 
 more-than-mirrored ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties 
 between teams.   
 
At the solution deployment phase, the focus shifts to governing against opportunism 
(Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).  As discussed, when the selling team members have 
intense ties to one another, the buying firm may have a moral hazard problem with the 
selling team.  The increased risk of selling team opportunism should lower the buyer’s 
confidence that the selling team is acting in its interests.  Therefore, prior research would 
suggest that the buying firm is likely to prefer more-than-mirrored ties between members 
of the buying and selling team in order to increase the likelihood of detecting selling team 
opportunism (e.g., Coleman 1988).    
 H2b: During the solution deployment phase, the relationship between intense ties 
 within the selling team and solution effectiveness is more positive when there are 
 more-than-mirrored ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties 
 between teams.   
 
We offer an alternative hypothesis, however, based on our previous discussion of (more-
than-) mirrored ties.  Specifically, non-mirrored ties (which are included in MTMT 
networks) are characterized by significant information asymmetries between members.  
Therefore, the ability to detect opportunism among non-mirrored ties is minimal (Wathne 
and Heide 2000).  Thus, from an efficiency perspective, buying firms may prefer to focus 
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their energies on mirrored ties because they are best equipped to detect opportunism.  
Formally,  
 H2balt: During the solution deployment phase, the relationship between intense ties 
 within the selling team and solution effectiveness is less positive when there are 
 more-than-mirrored ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties 
 between teams.   
 
 
10.3 Tie Intensity between Teams and Mirrored Ties 
As stated previously, intense between-team ties should signal the ability to transfer the 
complex knowledge necessary to learn customer preferences and to co-create customer 
solutions (Dhar, Menon, and Maach 2004; Reagans and McEvily 2003; Tuli, Kohli, and 
Bharadwaj 2007).  More-than-mirrored ties may also be beneficial during the 
development phase because they signal an increased opportunity for members of both 
teams to consider and integrate multiple perspectives.   
Although both intense and more-than-mirrored ties between teams may be beneficial, 
research suggests that combining them can result in “overembeddedness”, whereby 
maintenance of the ties becomes unwieldy (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000, p. 
372).  Therefore, intense between-team ties and more-than-mirrored between-team ties 
are likely to be substitutes, rather than complements.  Formally,  
 H3a: During the solution development phase, the relationship between intense 
 between-team ties and solution effectiveness is less positive when there are more-
 than-mirrored ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties between 
 teams.   
 
Both intense ties and more-than-mirrored ties between teams can also play key 
governance roles during the solution deployment phase.  That is, frequent communication 
(via intense ties) between teams can not only monitor behavior directly but can also can 
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increase trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 1990) and commitment 
between teams (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Per prior research, the observability 
mechanism associated with MTMTs between teams should also allay the concerns for 
opportunism (Coleman 1988).  Thus, like the previous hypothesis, intense ties and more-
than-mirrored ties between teams are likely to act as substitutes.  This is also consistent 
with our other argument regarding the ability of mirrored-ties to effectively monitor 
behavior more efficiently.   
 H3b: During the solution deployment phase, the relationship between intense Q
 between-team ties and solution effectiveness is less positive when there are more-
 than-mirrored  ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties between 



































11.1 Conjoint Study 
We chose to conduct a field-based conjoint experiment to test our hypotheses for two key 
reasons.  First, a conjoint experiment allows one to examine attributes simultaneously and 
allows the researcher to understand the relative importance of attributes, while still 
maintaining an attractive level of realism (e.g., Wuyts et al. 2004).  This is vital to the 
present paper because we are most interested in the concurrent network characteristics 
that exist within and between buying and selling teams.  Second, it may be difficult for a 
respondent (i.e., purchasing manager) to be highly familiar with a supplier’s internal 
network.  Therefore, we utilized both a text-based and a corresponding picture-based 
conjoint experiment to highlight relevant network attributes.  The picture-based design 
was carefully crafted to eliminate demographic differences (e.g., age, gender, race 
diversity) among network members.  This is important because demographic diversity 
has been found to affect team processes and subsequently, team performance (e.g., 
Williams and O'Reilly 1998).   
 
11.2 Experimental Design for Conjoint Study 
The dependent variable is customer solution effectiveness during the development and 
deployment phases.  We manipulate three independent variables (attributes), each at two 
levels: (1) tie intensity within the selling team (frequent and infrequent communication), 
(2) tie intensity between the selling and buying teams (frequent and infrequent 
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communication) and (3) mirrored ties (mirrored ties and more-than-mirrored ties) (see 
Tables 3 and 4).  This results in a 23 x 2 (phases) full factorial design (16 total runs) – 8 
runs for the solution development phase and 8 runs for the solution deployment phase.  
This design elicits 16 total responses from each respondent (i.e., 8 for both phases), 
which pretests showed to not be too time-consuming.  (Because we are collecting data at 
two phases of the solution process, we keep the tie intensity of the buying team fixed at 
‘high’ (i.e., frequent communication).  If we were to vary tie intensity within the buying 
team, the design would become too time-consuming and cumbersome for the respondents 
(i.e., requiring 32 total runs)).  We randomize the order of the runs to reduce the 
possibility of order bias.  The full factorial design allows us to clearly interpret all 
interactions.  No main effects, two-way interactions or three-way interactions are aliased 
(confounded) with any other main effects, two-way interactions or three-way interactions 
(Box and Draper 1987). 
 The scenario is that of a purchasing manager tasked with working with his/her 
own team members as well as selling team members to purchase a complex IT solution 
(see Appendix for full scenario).  This purchasing scenario approximates that found in 













Text-based Conjoint Attribute Levels 
 
Dependent Variable: Solution Effectiveness 
To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 
timely (design/development) (deployment) of an effective solution that meets your firm's 
expectations?  
 
Very unlikely                                                                                                        Very 
likely 
  1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9             10 
 
Manipulated Attributes and Their Levels 
1.) Tie intensity within 
the selling team 
+1: Within the selling team, members communicate with 
each other several times per week 
-1: Within the selling team, members communicate with each 
other only a few times per month 
  
2.) Tie intensity  
between the 
buying and selling 
teams 
+1: Members of your buying team communicate several 
times  per week with those members of the selling team 
that they  are connected to 
-1: Members of your buying team communicate only a few 
times per month with those members of the selling team 
that they are connected to 
  




buying and selling 
teams 
+1: There are 7 linkages between members of your team and 
members of the selling team 
-1: There are 3 linkages between members of your team and 

















Before sending purchasing managers the conjoint study, the instrument underwent two 
rounds of pre-testing.  First, it was subjected to review by six PhD candidates across 
management disciplines, eighteen MBA students, and three academics.  The extensive 
feedback generated in this phase was then incorporated into the instrument.  The 
instrument then underwent another round of pre-testing from six individuals with 
significant purchasing experience.  Responses from pre-test participants indicated that the 
picture-based scenarios were very helpful to understanding the context and questions in 
the survey.  Overall, the pre-testing led to significant changes in the opening scenario, the 
text-based description of network attributes, the picture-based illustration of network 
attributes, and question wording.   
11.4 Data Collection 
Approximately 4,580 members across seven different chapters of the National 
Association of Purchasing Managers were contacted.  The request to participate was sent 
by email which included a link to the online conjoint task.  This email was accompanied 
by an endorsement of the head of the local chapter as well as a pledge to donate $25 to 
one of three charities of the respondent’s choice (Habitat for Humanity, Save the Children, 
American Cancer Society).  A reminder email was sent approximately one week after the 
initial email.  Based on discussions with chapter heads, only approximately 20% of 
emails sent by chapter heads to their members are actually opened.  This is likely largely 
due to the privacy and security policies of the respondents’ firms.  Therefore, the 
approximate number of members who opened our email was 916.  We received 281 
completed surveys within two weeks, for an effective response rate of 30.7%.  This is a 
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more than adequate sample size because each respondent is responding to 16 solution 
effectiveness questions. 
11.5 Informant Quality 
We assessed informant quality to ensure that respondents were qualified to understand 
and to answer the questions in the study in a meaningful way.  Specifically, we asked 
each participant to respond (on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree)) 
to questions regarding the extent to which they are familiar, knowledgeable, and have 
been involved with purchasing integrating systems solutions (IT or other).  We took the 
mean scores across these three informant quality checks and deleted all respondents with 
mean scores less than 3.  This resulted in a final data set of 233 individuals. 
11.6 Statistical Model and Data Analysis 
Since the dependent variable is a rating on a 10-point scale and we have repeated 
observations for each participant, we use fixed effects linear regression with clustered 
robust standard errors.  Fixed-effects models control for observed and unobserved, time-
invariant variables across respondents (e.g., age, race, gender, intelligence and so on) 
(Allison 2005).  We also use clustered robust standard errors because responses are 
clustered by individual (and, therefore, are not independent of each other).   
The fixed-effects model explaining solution effectiveness (Yij) is as follows: 
(1) Yij = μj + βxij + αi + εij  
Subscripts i (i=1,…,n) and j (j=1,…,J) denote individual (respondent) and ratings task 
(scenarios), respectively.  αi  represents the time-invariant characteristics of the 
respondents.  μj is an intercept that can vary across rating tasks (scenarios).  εij error term 







 Table 5 presents the results.  It is noteworthy that mirrored ties rather than more-
than-mirrored ties are more effective at both the solution development and deployment 
phases.  These findings run in contrast to noteworthy views in the extant literature.  
Therefore, we expand on potential reasons for these discrepancies in the Explanations for 
Alternative Findings section (below).  Descriptive statistics are provided for the most and 
least effective scenarios across both phases of the solution process in Table 6. 
 H1a (β= .14, p < .001) and H1b (β= .20, p < .001) are both supported, which 
suggests that the relationship between intense ties within the selling team and solution 
effectiveness is more positive when the between-team ties are more intense during both 
the solution development and the solution deployment phases.  H2a (β= -.10, p < .01) and 
H2b (β= -.13, p < .001) are not supported, but H2balt is supported (β= -.13, p < .001).  
These results suggest that the relationship between intense ties within the selling team 
and solution effectiveness is less positive when there are more-than-mirrored ties between 
teams than when there are mirrored-only ties between teams during the solution 
development and deployment phases.  The finding for H2alt provides evidence for our 
proposed alternative view of network density (i.e., mirrored-ties are able to efficiently 
monitor behavior because of their ability to do so).  H3a is supported (β= -.07, p < .05), 
but H3b is not supported (β= .00, ns), which suggests that the relationship between intense 
between-team ties and solution effectiveness is less positive when there are more-than-
mirrored ties between teams than when there are mirrored-only ties between teams only 
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during the solution development phase.  We plot these interactions for the solution 
development phase in Figures 2a – 2c (solution deployment results are largely the same 














































Fixed Effects Linear Regression with Clustered Robust Standard Errors 
 





Independent variables   
Main effects   








 Tie intensity between the selling 







 More-than-mirrored ties (mtmt) 












































F-value 58.87*** 63.91*** 
 
* p ≤ .05     ** p ≤ .01     *** p ≤ .001 
 
Notes:  Unstandardized coefficients; 233 clusters; 1,864 observations in each phase; 






















Std. Dev.: 1.76 
 
Least Effective 














































































































































12.1 Three-way Interaction 
Our results suggest that there is a significant three-way interaction among the three 
independent variables during the solution development phase (β= .06, p < .05).  To better 
understand the nature of this three-way interaction, we plot the interaction out using the 
procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) (Figures 3a and 3b).  In the more-than-
mirrored between-team ties condition, the relationship between tie intensity within the 
selling team and solution development effectiveness is much more positive when the 
between-team ties are intense than when they are weak.  On the other hand, in the 
mirrored-only between-team ties condition, the slopes of the regression lines between tie 
intensity within the selling team and solution development effectiveness are very similar 





















































































12.2 Explanations for Alternative Findings 
Past research would suggest that more-than-mirrored ties should increase the opportunity 
to share information (which would be beneficial during the solution development phase) 
as well as increase the ability to observe and monitor behavior (which would be 
beneficial during the solution deployment phase) (Coleman 1988).  Our findings, 
however, suggest the opposite effects for both phases.  We suggest there are two main 
reasons for this.   
 First, from an efficiency perspective, purchasing managers may prefer fewer 
between-team ties (i.e., mirrored ties) because they are easier to maintain.  This is 
consistent with homophily or, the notion that people tend to connect with similar others 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001) and the related, similarity-attraction 
paradigm (Byrne 1961), which suggests that communication is easier, more desirable, 
and more satisfying when individuals possess similar attitudes (cf. Williams and O’Reilly 
1998).  Thus, individuals are likely to prefer mirrored-only ties to more-than-mirrored 
ties because the latter include more dissimilar others.  In addition, as we argued earlier, 
mirrored-ties (because of the knowledge similarities between members) are able to 
efficiently (because they do not include ties to individuals with dissimilar knowledge) 
and effectively monitor behavior during the solution deployment phase (Wathne and 
Heide 2000).   
 Second, from a personal power standpoint, purchasing managers (i.e., the role of 
respondents in this study) may prefer mirrored-tie networks because more-than-mirrored 
tie networks may decrease their betweenness centrality (i.e., the extent of their ‘go-
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between’) and, therefore, their control advantages within the network4 (Burt 1992).  
Therefore, future research is needed to understand whether our results are, in part, due to 
the respondent playing a key role in the network (e.g., as purchasing manager), as 
opposed to a senior manager providing effectiveness ratings as an outside-the-network 
observer. 
 These explanations provide some clarity with respect to our unsupported 
hypotheses.  For instance, H2a asserts that, during the solution development phase, the 
relationship between intense ties within the selling team and solution effectiveness is 
more positive when there are more-than-mirrored ties between teams than when there are 
mirrored-only ties between teams.  Our findings, however, suggest that buying teams 
prefer mirrored-ties (i.e., the relationship is less positive) in such an instance.  Given the 
preceding rationale, one could argue that purchasing managers prefer to preserve their 
betweenness centrality when they are assured that selling team members are frequently 
communicating about solution development.     
 
12.3 Differences between Phases 
It is noteworthy that there were very few differences between phases.  Indeed, only three 
coefficients showed significant differences between the solution development and 
deployment phases (Table 7).  It appears, therefore, that intense ties within the selling 
team may be more critical to solution effectiveness during the solution development 
phase than during the solution deployment phase.  Mirrored ties between teams are 
                         
4 The actual betweenness centrality of the purchasing agent in the present scenarios can be calculated (e.g., 
in Ucinet).  For the more-than-mirrored tie scenarios, the purchasing agent’s betweenness centrality score is 
.50, whereas in the mirrored only tie conditions, the purchasing agent’s betweenness centrality score is 1.0.  
This lends credence to the notion that personal power effects may be driving some of our results.  It should 
be noted, however, that it is possible for one’s betweenness centrality to be higher under different scenarios 
of more-than-mirrored ties. 
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effective when the between-team ties are intense during the solution development phases, 
but have no impact on effectiveness when the between-team ties are intense during the 
solution deployment phase.  Although the overall similarities between the two phases is 
somewhat surprising, recent research also suggests minimal differences between solution 
development effectiveness and solution deployment effectiveness (Tuli, Kohli, and 
Bharadwaj 2007). 
 
12.4 Robustness Checks 
We ran multiple robustness checks to assure that meaningful differences were not found 
across different assessment choices.  Specifically, the coefficients and the pattern of our 
results do not change significantly across multiple measures of informant quality.  For 
instance, our results are largely the same for different levels of familiarity, knowledge 


















Test of Differences between Phases (Clustered robust regression) 
 
Dependent variable  
Solution Effectiveness 
Independent variables  
Main effects  
 Tie intensity within the 
selling team (tist) 
.63*** 
 
 Tie intensity between the 
selling and buying teams (tibt) 
.87*** 
 






 tist * tibt .09 
 tist * mtmt -.07 
 tibt * mtmt -.13
* 
 tist * tibt * mtmt .16
** 
  
Differences between solution development and solution deployment phases 
 Phase .14** 
 Phase * tist -.08
* 
 Phase * tibt .04 
 Phase * mtmt -.01 
 Phase * tist * tibt .05 
 Phase * tist * mtmt -.03 
 Phase * tibt * mtmt .07
* 









* p ≤ .05     ** p ≤ .01     *** p ≤ .001 
 









 Given the theoretical and practical linkages within and between buying and 
selling teams (e.g., Hutt and Walker 2006; Johnston and Bonoma 1981), it is surprising 
that there has been little  empirical research to date on these issues.  The present research, 
therefore, begins to address this void by focusing on how (a) intense ties within the 
selling team, (b) intense ties between the selling and buying teams and (c) (more-than-) 
mirrored ties between the buying and selling teams affect solution effectiveness at both 
the solution development and solution deployment stages.  Below, we outline important 
theoretical and managerial implications.  
13.1 Theoretical Implications 
The present study contributes to theory in four important ways.  First, we introduce the 
notions of mirrored and more-than-mirrored ties.  This addresses the need to better 
understand the qualitative aspects of network structure and moves beyond a mere count 
of network ties which traditionally determines network density.  Importantly, the 
mirrored tie perspective presents an alternate view from which to understand information 
exchange, governance and efficiency between buying and selling team networks. 
 Second, our research extends prior research on the interactive effects of network 
characteristics (i.e., density and tie strength) between firms (Rowley, Behrens, and 
Krackhardt 2000).  The pattern of some of our results complement and extend prior 
research that suggests that network density and tie strength between firms may be 
substitutes of each other (due to the likelihood of  “overembeddedness”) (Rowley, 
 75 
 
Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000) (i.e., we show that more-than-mirrored ties between 
teams tend to reduce the positive effects that intense ties within the selling team and 
intense ties between teams have on solution effectiveness).  Importantly, we also advance 
the literature by showing that intense ties within and between teams act as compliments of 
each other.  Thus, our findings suggest that intense within and between team ties are less 
prone to “overembeddedness”.   
 The literature lends clarity to this notion by suggesting that intense ties can 
actually enhance efficiencies.  Uzzi (1997), for example, suggests that embedded (“close 
or special,” p. 41) relationships can promote economies of time.  In his ethnographic 
study of women’s better-dress apparel firms in New York City, he finds that embedded 
relationships are characterized by trust, fine-grained information transfer and joint 
problem solving.  He suggests that trust acts like a heuristic which can speed decision-
making.  Trust-as-a-heuristic, therefore, confers time and cognitive resource saving 
advantages (Uzzi 1997).  Regarding information transfer, he suggests that strong ties are 
more likely to transfer proprietary and tacit information in a more holistic manner, which 
saves the time of having to piece information together.  From a problem-solving 
standpoint, he argues that embedded relationships are more flexible in that they allowed 
problems to be worked out “on the fly” (p. 47).  Heuristic processing, holistic information 
transfer and flexible problem solving, therefore, should enhance the efficiencies of 
intense ties, reducing the potential for “overembeddedness”5. 
                         
5 Intense ties should not be considered a panacea, however.  Indeed, frequent communication can also be 
inefficient.  For example, in a new product development context Hansen (1999) argues that intense ties 
between members communicating codified knowledge (easy to articulate knowledge) is inefficient.  
Alternatively, weak ties (characterized by infrequent communication) are likely to slow projects down 
when information is non-codified (i.e., complex).  In such an instance, team members spend time 
interpreting information for which there may be little opportunity for further explanation (because there is 
less communication).  Such inferences lead to inefficiencies and potentially costly errors or delays. 
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 Third, we advance the nascent literature on team dyads and the linkages between 
them (sometimes referred to as two-mode networks in the literature) (Iacobucci and 
Hopkins 1992).  Although dyadic sets of individuals are very prevalent in practice 
(Granovetter 1985), the extant marketing literature typically focuses on firm-level dyads, 
individual-level dyads, or one-mode networks (i.e., a network encompassing a single 
focal member/node).  Thus, our study extends this work as well as recent research on 
triadic relationships (e.g., Wathne and Heide 2004; Wuyts et al. 2004) to the realm of 
team dyads. 
 Fourth, although many of the effects found in this study were similar across both 
the solution development and solution deployment phases, there were notable differences 
nonetheless.  For instance, our results suggest that intense ties within the selling team are 
more important to effectiveness during the solution development phase than the solution 
deployment phase.  We also found that more-than-mirrored ties reduce the positive 
impact that intense between-team ties have of solution effectiveness during the 
development phase, but not during the deployment phase.  This finding sharpens prior 
work that examines overall firm performance as a function of the interactive effects of tie 
strength and network density between firms (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000). 
 
13.2 Managerial Implications 
The present research should provide significant insights and recommendations to 
practicing managers.  First, it is critical for managers to understand what their customers 
perceive to be most effective for developing and deploying effective solutions.  For 
instance, managers of salespeople and selling teams should understand that purchasing 
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managers equate intense ties within the selling team to solution effectiveness at both the 
solution development and deployment phases.  Therefore, managers should educate their 
selling teams to signal and to make salient to buying team members that they are indeed 
communicating frequently among themselves about the customer’s solution (at both the 
solution development and deployment phases). 
 Selling teams also need to understand that customers may find more-than-
mirrored ties to be detrimental to solution effectiveness and that these types of ties can 
actually reduce any positive effects that intense ties create.  Thus, we illustrate to 
managers how the interplay between within-team and between-team factors can affect 
solution effectiveness. 
 
13.3 Limitations and Future Research  
This research presents an initial step towards understanding concurrent within and 
between team network linkages.  As a result, this study has several limitations which may 
pave the way for fruitful future research.  First, our results stem from the perspective of 
the purchasing manager.  Thus, personal power considerations may trump solution 
effectiveness considerations (a point we considered earlier in the Results section).  Future 
research, therefore, needs to assess what non-network members (e.g., sales manager, VP 
of Purchasing) perceive to be ideal network characteristics for solution effectiveness.  
Moreover, a parallel study done from the perspective of key account managers, for 
example, could shed light on discrepancies between purchasing managers and key 
salespeople.  Such a study would complement the emerging solutions literature which 
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suggests that solution effectiveness may mean very different things to buyers and sellers 
(Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). 
 Second, our experimental design allowed for the testing of only a few network 
theory variables.  Thus, future research should vary within-team density, for example, 
because within-team density should also have important information sharing and 
governance implications.  Further research should also examine how differences in the 
centrality of network members within and across teams affect information exchange and 
governance. 
 Third, we found very few differences between solution development and solution 
deployment.  Although this is consistent with recent research (Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 
2007), future research should examine solution stages that may precede solution 
development (e.g., negotiation) and/or follow solution deployment (e.g., maintenance) 
(e.g., Jap and Ganesan 2000).  It may be the case, for example, that intense between-team 
ties are less effective during the maintenance stage.  
 Fourth, some of our theory rests in part on efficiency arguments; however, we did 
not measure network efficiency directly.  Thus, future research should draw attention to 
and elaborate on the emerging, but oftentimes neglected, perspective of network 
efficiencies associated with strong/weak ties (e.g., Hansen 1999).  Moreover, research is 
needed to assess why and when (more-than-) mirrored ties, for example, are perceived to 















micro Transaction-specific investmentsa   
I have had to talk to many different people in order to understand this 
customer’s specific needs .75 
I have made many visits to build relationships with this customer’s employees .66 
Learning how to get things done for this customer has been a time consuming 
process .75 
Learning this customer’s unique policies has taken considerable effort on my 
part  .68 
The knowledge I’ve acquired while working with this customer is hard to use 
with other customersb  
  
Concern for internal opportunisma 
I am concerned about my specialists…   
…promising to do things, even though they actually have no  
    intention of following through  .77 
…exaggerating their needs to get what they desire .85 
…altering the facts to get what they want .90 
…hiding important information from me .85 
…shirking on their obligations to me .88 
…trying to make me a scapegoat for problems with this customer .82 
…pushing inappropriate products on this customer  .85 
…taking undue credit for business I develop with this customer .87 
 
Internal safeguardinga 
The account manager for this customer…  
…encourages specialists to call on this customer regardless of whether 
    he/she is with them or not (R) .79 
…suggests to his/her specialists that they check with him/her before 
    they call on this customer .71 
…provides his/her specialists with information on this customer on a  
   ‘need to know’ basis .68 
…proactively provides information about this customer’s decision- 
    making procedures to his/her specialists (R) .70 
…advises this customer to use him/her as its primary contact in our  
    companyb  
…is cautious about the kind of information he/she shares with his/her 





Performance with customer 
(5-pt. Likert scale anchored by ‘very poorly’ and ‘very well’) 
Relative to your competitors how has your firm performed at this 
customer in…  
…achieving customer satisfaction .86 
…providing value .91 
…attaining revenue growth .83 
…securing customer share .78 
…successfully introducing new products .75 
  
Extendedness between account manager and customera  
My relationship with this customer will last far into the future. .95 
I expect to continue working with this customer on a long-term basis .97 
  
Extendedness between account manager’s specialist(s) and customera  
My specialists’ relationships with this customer will last far into the future. .98 
My specialists expect to continue working with this customer on a long-term 
basis .96 
  
Promotion aspirations of specialistsa  
My specialists’ plans include attaining higher positions within management  .60 
My specialists would like to be in positions of greater influence in their 
department/organization .95 
For my specialists, the hassles of being in higher positions within management 
would outweigh the benefitsb (R)  
It would not bother my specialists if they were to continue to do the same kind 
of workb (R)  
  
  
Control variables  
Management monitoringa  
Management is actively involved with this customer .74 
Management closely monitors our progress with this customer .85 
My specialists and I jointly meet with management to discuss our progress 
with this customer .54 





For this customer, my specialist(s) and I…  
…have different goals and objectives .81 
…have different time orientations .85 





Benevolence of specialistsa  
My specialists look out for what is important to me  .90 
My specialists are concerned about my welfare .97 
My needs and desires are important to my specialists .94 
My specialists will go out of their way to help meb  
  
Competence of specialistsa  
My specialists are knowledgeable about their products .98 
I have high regard for my specialists’ capabilities .83 
My specialists know a lot about their respective products .95 
I trust my specialists’ judgment about business mattersb   
My specialists can offer good adviceb  
  
Number of specialists (team size): 
Please indicate the number of each of the following types of specialists with responsibility for 
this customer: 
Product specialists  _____             
Technical specialists  _____       
Finance specialists  _____ 
Marketing specialists  _____ 
Other    _____  
 
Sales experience of account manager: 
Total sales experience: __________ years 
 
a 5-pt. Likert scale anchored by ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 

























Introduction: You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Brian 
Murtha and Dr. Goutam Challagalla, from the Georgia Institute of Technology. The 
results of this study will be used in academic and business publications.  You were 
selected as a possible participant in this study because of your experience in sales. You 
should read the information below, and ask questions about anything you do not 
understand, before deciding whether or not to participate.  
Participation and Withdrawal: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary 
and you are free to choose whether to be in it or not. If you choose to participate, or if 
you choose not to participate, it will not affect your job in any way.  If you choose to be 
in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at any time without penalty or 
consequences of any kind.  
Procedure: We would like you to complete the enclosed survey.  We will request that 
you think only about a particular customer as you answer the questions and to provide the 
customer’s name.  We are only asking you for the customer name in order for your 
manager to respond to a small subset of these same questions with this same customer in 
mind.  Please be assured that s/he will never have access to any of your individual 
responses.  Your job should not be affected in any way because we are asking for you to 
respond to the survey thinking about the last customer you called on for which you used 
or could have used the help of your specialists (in other words, this is a random customer 
choice).  Moreover, your manager will never see any of your responses to the questions 
in this survey.   
Purpose and Benefits of the Study: The purpose of this study is to better understand 
selling tasks that can involve specialists such as product managers/specialists, technical 
specialists, and finance specialists.  After these data are collected, they will be presented 
both in the form of academic publications and also in an executive summary format.  If 
you choose to participate in the survey, you will be given access to these reports as a 
token of our appreciation.    
Compensation to You: Upon completion of the survey, you will receive, via 
email, a $10 Amazon.com gift card.   
Potential Risks: None are known or expected.  
Confidentiality: Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that 
can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your 
permission or as required by law. Company executives will not have access to the raw 




Identification of Investigators 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact:                                  
Brian Murtha    Goutam Challagalla                                                                            
(Co-Principal Investigator)  (Principal Investigator and Faculty Sponsor)                                     
College of Management   College of Management                                                                      
Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Institute of Technology                                                         
800 West Peachtree St., NW   800 West Peachtree St., NW                                                           
Atlanta, GA  30332    Atlanta, GA  30332                            
404-944-8191    404-894-4362                                               
brian.murtha@mgt.gatech.edu  Goutam.challagalla@mgt.gatech.edu  
Rights of Research Subjects 
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in 
this research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Office of Research 
Compliance, Georgia Tech, Research Administration Building, 505 Tenth Street, Atlanta, 
Georgia 30332, 404-894-6944. 
 



























Sales Effectiveness Study 
 
Researchers: 
         Goutam Challagalla, Ph.D.                            Brian Murtha, Ph.D. Candidate 
    Georgia Institute of Technology         Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
               
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in this study.  Its purpose is to 
better understand selling tasks that can involve specialists such as product specialists, 
technical specialists, and so on.   
 
Your response is very important to us.  Please rest assured that your individual responses 
will be kept completely confidential and will not be revealed to anyone other than the 
researchers for this study.  The results will be reported in summary form only.  As a 
token of our appreciation, upon completion of this survey, we will email you a $10 gift 
card to Amazon.com. 
 
 
You can complete this survey in one of two ways: 
 
1. Insert your responses into this document and email it to 
brian.murtha@mgt.gatech.edu, 
Or 
2. Print the document, complete it by hand, and mail it to: 
 
Brian Murtha 
College of Management 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
800 West Peachtree Street NW 
Atlanta, Georgia 30308 





Please think about the last customer you called on for which you actually used or could 
have used specialists in your selling effort. (“Specialists” can mean your product 
specialists, technical specialists, and so on.)  Please provide the name of this customer in 
the space below (we would like to ask your manager a small subset of the questions in 
this survey with respect to this customer).  Please be assured that s/he will never have 
access to any of your individual responses.   
 
Customer name:   _____________________________________ (required) 
 
 
Please focus on this customer as you respond to all questions in this survey.   
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SECTION I*:  Please place an ‘X’ in the appropriate box to indicate the extent to which 
you disagree or agree with the following statements. 
 




1. I have invested a lot of time to get to know this customer 
 
2. I have had to talk to many different people in order to 
understand this customer’s specific needs 
3. I have made many visits to build relationships with this 
customer’s employees 
4. Learning how to get things done for this customer has been a 
time consuming process 
5. The knowledge I’ve acquired while working with this customer 
is hard to use with other customers 
6. Learning this customer’s unique policies has taken considerable 






SECTION II:  Now we’d like to ask you some questions regarding the specialists you 
use or could use to help you sell to the customer you identified earlier. 
 
      
 
 
Compared to my specialists… 
1. …I know more about this customer’s policies  
 
2. …I have a better idea about what people at this customer like 
    and dislike 
3. …I know more about how decisions are made at this customer 
 
4. …I better understand how the customer positions itself against 
    its competitors 
5. …I am more informed about what our competitors are doing for 














1. My specialists look out for what is important to me  
2. My specialists are concerned about my welfare 
3. My needs and desires are important to my specialists 
4. My specialists will go out of their way to help me 
5. My specialists are knowledgeable about their products 
6. I trust my specialists’ judgment about business matters  
7. My specialists can offer good advice 
8. I have high regard for my specialists’ capabilities 







My specialists…     
1. …demonstrate originality in their work 
 
2. …find new uses for existing products 
 
3. …try out new ideas and approaches to problems 
 
4. …identify opportunities for new products 
 
5. …feel that decisions with this customer should reflect my  
    preferences because I have more at stake than they do 
6. …feel they ought to comply with me because decisions with this 







1. My specialists’ plans include attaining higher positions within 
management  
2. For my specialists, the hassles of being in higher positions 
within management would outweigh the benefits  
3. My specialists would like to be in positions of greater influence 
in their department/organization 
4. It would not bother my specialists if they were to continue to do 










For this customer, my specialists and I… 
1. …have different goals and objectives 
2. …have different time orientations 





Compared to me, my specialists…     
1. …are more up to date on their respective products 
 
2. …can more accurately recommend correct configurations of  
    their products 
3. …can better explain the nuances of their respective products 
 
4. …know how to effectively position their products against the  





SECTION III:  Now, we would like to ask you a few questions about the relationships 






1. My relationship with this customer will last far into the future. 
 




3. My relationship with my specialists will last far into the future 
 
4. My specialists and I expect to continue working with each other 
on a long-term basis.  
 
 
5. My specialists’ relationships with this customer will last far into 
the future. 
6. My specialists expect to continue working with this customer on 




SECTION IV:  Account managers tend to differ in how they utilize their specialists.  
Some encourage close involvement of their specialists with their customers, whereas 
others prefer to do most of the work on their own and treat specialists as resources to be 
drawn upon as needed.  Please place an ‘X’ in the appropriate box to indicate the extent 





1. I encourage my specialists to call on this customer regardless of 
whether I’m with them or not 
2. I suggest to my specialists that they check with me before they 
call on this customer 
3. I have indicated to specialists that information for this customer 
should be routed through me 
4. I encourage my specialists to contact any and all of the 
employees at this customer 
5. I advise this customer to use me as their primary contact for 
communicating with our company 
6. I am cautious about the kind of information I share with my 
specialists about this customer 
7. I provide my specialists with information on this customer on a 
‘need to know’ basis 
8. I proactively provide information about this customer’s 
decision-making procedures to my specialists 
9 I am careful when it comes to giving my specialists information 
about this customer’s employees 
10 I make my entire ‘rolodex’ of contacts at this customer readily 




SECTION V:  Now, we’d like to ask you some questions about the outcomes associated 





1. I would like my investments at this customer to improve my 
financial well-being 
2. It is important that the time I have invested in this customer 
translate into a financial payoff for me  
3. I would like the effort I have dedicated to this customer to result 
in better paychecks for me 
4. I would be disappointed if my work at this customer does not 
result in higher commissions for me 
5. The money I make off of my work with this customer is of little 







1. I want my efforts with this customer to enhance my standing 
within my firm 
2. I would like my relationship building efforts at this customer to 
enhance my standing among my co-workers  
3. It is important that the time I have invested in this customer 
translate into a better reputation for me 
 
4. I think about ways to leverage my work with this customer to 









1. This customer often exaggerates its needs to get what it desires 
from me 
2. This customer often alters the facts to get what it wants from me 
 
3. This customer often promises to do things for me, even though it 
actually has no intention of following through 
4. I have reason to believe that this customer hides important 
information from me  
 
 
SECTION VII:   Next, we’d like to ask you some more questions regarding your work 





1. I used to spend more time developing relationships at this 
customer than I do now  
2. The bulk of my involvement with this customer happened a long 
time ago 
3. Most of my effort with this customer has been in the recent past 
  
4. I am concerned about what others in my firm may think about 
my dealings with this customer 
5. I worry my manager may think I have done a poor job of 
building relationships with this customer 
6. I am concerned my specialists may think I do not know the right 
people at this customer 
7. I am concerned about how my co-workers might perceive my 
work with this customer  
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Please indicate how you would rate your work with this customer relative to your firm’s 
expectations on the following criteria: (answers are 1 = below expectations to 5 = above 
expectations 




1. Quality of relationships I have developed at this customer 
 
2. Quality of records I maintain about this customer 
 
3. Level of customer personnel I call on 
 
4. My knowledge of how decisions are made by this customer  
 
5. My understanding of decision-makers’ likes and dislikes 
 
6. The job I have done positioning our products against our 





SECTION VIII:  The following questions refer to the involvement of your management 
(i.e., your manager and your specialists’ managers) with this customer. 
 




1. Management is actively involved with this customer 
 
2. Management closely monitors our progress with this customer 
 
3. My specialists and I jointly meet with management to discuss 
developments at this customer 
4. Management periodically asks this customer for feedback on 
how we are doing 
5. Management reviews internal reports which track our progress 












SECTION IX:  Please indicate your firm’s performance with this customer on the 




Relative to your competitors, how has your firm performed at this 
customer in… 
1. …achieving customer satisfaction 
2. …providing value 
3. …attaining revenue growth 
4. …successfully introducing new products 
5. …securing customer share 
 




1. We have yet to sell many of our products to this customer  
 
2. We have many opportunities to grow our revenues from this 
customer  






SECTION X:  Some specialists can be very helpful and others less so.  For this 




I am concerned about my specialists… 
1. …promising to do things, even though they actually have no  
    intention of following through  
2. …exaggerating their needs to get what they desire 
 
3. …shirking on their obligations to me 
 
4. …taking undue credit for business I develop with this customer 
5. …altering the facts to get what they want 
 
6. …pushing inappropriate products on this customer 
 
7. …trying to make me a scapegoat for problems with this  
    customer 





SECTION XI:  Next, we would like to ask you a few sales-related questions. 




1. It is easy for me to get customer to see my point of view  
 
2. I am good at finding out what customers want 
 
3. I know the right thing to do in selling situations 
 
4. My temperament is not well-suited for selling 
 
5. It is difficult for me to put pressure on a customer 
 
6. I am good at selling 
 
7. I find it difficult to convince a customer that has a different 










1. I would like to be in a position of greater influence in my 
department/organization 
2. My plans include attaining a higher position within management 
 
3. For me the hassles of being in a higher position within 
management would outweigh the benefits 
4. It would not bother me if I was to continue to do the same kind 

















How long have you had a relationship with this customer:   Years: _____       Months: 
_____ 
 
What percent of the total revenues you generate comes from this customer _______% 
 
Total experience: __________ years 
 
Total sales experience: __________ years 
 
Gender:     Female___         Male____   
 
Please indicate the number of each of the following types of specialists with 
responsibility for this customer: 
Product specialists  _____             
Technical specialists  _____       
Finance specialists  _____ 
Marketing specialists  _____ 




Thank You Very Much! 
 
 

























Please think only about the following customer when answering the questions below: 
 
Customer name:  ______ _____________________ 
 




Relative to your competitors, how has your firm performed at this 
customer in…(answers are 1 = very poorly to 5 = very well) 
1. …achieving customer satisfaction 
2. …providing value 
3. …attaining revenue growth 
4. …securing customer share 
5. …successfully introducing new products  
 
(answers are 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)  
 
 
1. We have yet to sell many of our products to this customer  
2. We have many opportunities to grow our revenues from this customer 
3. This customer is a good prospect for many of our services 
 
 
(answer is = very unfamiliar to 5 = very familiar) 
1. Please indicate your familiarity with this customer   
 
Please respond to the following questions as they pertain to the account manager and 
his/her specialists assigned to this customer (“specialists” can mean the account 
manager’s product managers, technical specialists, finance specialists and so on).  
(answers are 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
      
 
 
The account manager for this customer… 
1. …encourages specialists to call on this customer regardless of whether 
he/she is with them or not 
2. …suggests to his/her specialists that they check with him/her before 
they call on this customer 
3. …advises this customer to use him/her as its primary contact in our 
Company 
4. …is cautious about the kind of information he/she shares with his/her 
specialists about this customer 
5. …provides his/her specialists with information on this customer on a 
‘need to know’ basis 
6. …proactively provides information about this customer’s decision-
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We ask you to participate in an academic research project that investigates relationships 
within and between buying and selling teams. There are no costs to you (except for your 
time) and the survey should take about 12 minutes to complete.  In appreciation for your 
completion of this survey, we will donate $25 to one of three charities . You will be able 
to choose which one at the end of the survey: American Cancer Society, Habitat for 
Humanity or Save the Children.  The information collected here is for research purposes 
only; it is not intended for commercial use and will not be shared or sold.   
The results of this project will be used in academic and business publications and will 
only be reported in summary form; any information that is obtained in connection with 
this study and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will be 
disclosed only with your permission or as required by law. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary and you are free to choose whether to be in it or not. If you 
choose to participate, or if you choose not to participate, it will not affect your job in any 
way. If you choose to be in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at any 
time without penalty or consequences of any kind. 
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in 
this research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions 
regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact Melanie Clark at the Office 
of Research Compliance, Georgia Tech, Research Administration Building, 505 Tenth 
Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30332, 404-894-6942. 
Your completion of this survey indicates your consent to be in this study. If you have any 
questions please contact Brian Murtha (404-944-8191). Thank you in advance for your 
participation. 
You can complete this survey in one of two ways: 
1. Insert your responses into this document and email it directly to 
brian.murtha@mgt.gatech.edu 
 




I. Instructions:  Please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the following 
scenario: 
 
Please put yourself in the role of purchasing manager for your firm.  Your firm is involved in 
purchasing an integrated computer network solution consisting of hardware (e.g., server, 
workstations, routers, switches, access points) and software (e.g., network operating system, 
network security software, application software).  This purchasing task requires that you include 
your functional and technical specialists in the solution process.  It also requires that your buying 
team works with members of the selling team to develop and implement an effective systems 
solution on time 
 
In the survey that follows, we will show you different scenarios.  In each scenario, there is a 
buying team and a selling team, each with three members.  Each scenario will describe four facets 
of the situation: 
 
1. The frequency of interaction within the buying team; 
2. The frequency of interaction within the selling team; 
3. The frequency of interaction between the two teams; 
4. The number of communication lines or relations between the two teams. 
 





Selling team members: Buying team members: 
Person 1 is the key salesperson assigned to 
your firm. S/he has a general base of 
knowledge, but often relies on his/her experts 
Person A is the purchasing manager for your 
firm.  YOU are the purchasing manager. 
Person 2 is an industry expert (i.e., s/he is an 
expert in the industry you are in) 
Person B is your industry expert (e.g., s/he is 
an expert in the industry you are in) 
Person 3 is a technical specialist (i.e., s/he 
knows everything there is to know about IT 
configurations) 
Person C is your technical specialist (i.e., s/he 





The lines connecting the people in the diagram reflect who interacts with whom. Whether 
the line is full or broken reflects how often they interact. 
 
———A solid line between any two people means that they communicate with each 
other frequently. By frequently, we mean at least several times per week.  
 
- - - - - A dashed line between any two people means that they communicate with each 




Since the overall systems solution is complex, we will distinguish between two phases in 
the buying process. 
1) The first phase is that of design and development. This includes defining and 
specifying the requirements and customizing and integrating the solution to fit your 
firm’s specific needs. 
2) The second phase is that of deployment. In this second phase, the total systems 
solution is being deployed or installed, and proper training of your users and staff is being 

































In this first phase, the total systems solution is being designed and developed. This 
phase includes defining the requirements and customizing the solution to fit your firm’s 
specific needs.  
 
After presenting each scenario, we will ask your assessment of whether the pattern of 
interaction in that particular scenario will result in an effective and timely solution that 
will meet your firm’s expectations.  
 
Before we proceed with the scenarios, please indicate your level of agreement with the 
following three statements: 
 
 
During the Design/Development phase of an integrated and customized computer 
network solution…  
 
 …large amounts of information need to be shared among members of buying and  
 selling teams 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
 …complex information needs to be shared among members of buying and selling 
 teams. 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
 …sharing large amounts of information among many members of the buying and 
 selling teams can become costly (i.e., inefficient) 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 










II. Okay, let’s get started 
 
The process should get easier as you familiarize yourself with the scenarios and 
illustrations. Please carefully consider pattern of interaction within and between the 
buying and selling teams when answering the questions. 
 
Scenario 1:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are 7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 





 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 
timely design/development of an effective solution that meets your firm's 
expectations?  
 (please place an “X” in the appropriate box) 
 
 
Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 










Scenario 2:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team  
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 3:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 4:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 5:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 6:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 7:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 






 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 8:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week  
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 





Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 





*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 












We would now like to ask you some questions about the deployment of the solution 
within your firm.  In this second phase, the total systems solution is being deployed or 




Before we proceed with the scenarios, please indicate your level of agreement with the 
following three statements: 
 
During the Deployment phase of an integrated and customized computer network 
solution…  
 
 …large amounts of information need to be shared among members of buying and 
 selling teams 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
 …complex information needs to be shared among members of buying and selling 
 teams. 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
 …sharing large amounts of information among many members of the buying and 
 selling teams can become costly (i.e., inefficient) 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 













Scenario 1:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 2:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team  
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 3:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 4:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 5:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate only a few times per month with 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 6:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 7:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other only a few times 
per month 
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are  7 linkages between members of your team and members of the selling 
team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 






 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Scenario 8:  
1. Within the selling team, members communicate with each other several times per 
week  
2. Within your buying team, members communicate with each other several times 
per week 
3. There are only 3 linkages between members of your team and members of the 
selling team 
4. Members of your buying team communicate several times per week with those 







 To what extent will this pattern of interaction within and between teams result in the 




Very unlikely     Very likely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 






*Please feel free to go back and change any answers at any time. 










Final Section:  Now, we would like to ask you a few final questions.  
 
1. During the design/development phase, frequent communication is very important 
in order to ... (Check all that apply) 
___ communicate complex information  
___ increase commitment  
___ increase empathy  
___ increase cohesiveness  
___ increase trust  
___ reduce conflict  
___ reduce shirking of responsibilities  
___ design a creative offering  
___ Other (please specify) _________________________________ 
 
 
2. During the deployment phase, frequent communication is very important in order 
to ... (Check all that apply) 
___ communicate complex information  
___ increase commitment  
___ increase empathy  
___ increase cohesiveness  
___ increase trust  
___ reduce conflict  
___ reduce shirking of responsibilities  
___ ensure timely deployment 
___ ensure effective delivery of promised solution  
___ Other (please specify) _________________________________ 
 
 
3. To what extent do the following statements describe your own professional 
situation? 
 
I am familiar with purchasing integrated systems solutions (IT or other). 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
I am knowledgeable about purchasing integrated systems solutions (IT or other). 
 
Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 




Strongly disagree     Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




4. How many years of work experience (full-time) do you have?: _____ 
 
5. What industry do you work in?: __________ 
 
6. Please provide us with any comments that you feel could help us understand 












Please choose which charity you would like $25 to go to from the list below. 
 
___ American Cancer Society  
 
___ Habitat for Humanity  
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